Justplainbill's Weblog

November 10, 2016

Honor

Honor, get some tissues. I did a bunch of these when I was stationed at Camp LeJeune. I won’t compare to the gits rioting against the election.

http://tinyurl.com/zom68at

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July 31, 2015

GOP sells U.S.A. to U.N. [nc]

Joseph R. John
To jrjassoc@earthlink.net
Today at 4:59 AM

Almost $200 Million Donated to Congressmen to Vote for Unconstitutional TPP/TPA & Eliminate US Sovereignty in Favor of International Tribunals

By Capt Joseph R. John, July 29, 2015

Please watch the two below listed very short videos, by clicking on the link, you will fully understand just how Speaker Boehner and Senate Majority Leader McConnell have betrayed what American citizens voted for in 2014. By ramming the SECRET 800 page Fast Track Trade Promotional (TPP) Bill and the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Bill thru Congress, that nearly 4 weeks after it was signed into law, American citizens are still not being permitted to read it.

TPP and TPA violate the US Constitution and eliminates US Sovereignty in favor of International Tribunals. The Republican leadership ignored the demands of millions of Americans who have been demanding that Congress to reduce illegal immigration by a substantial majority of 3 to 1 in a national opinion poll, and are treating American citizens as if they have no right to know what law they have passed—hiding the fact that it violates the US Constitution. Even though the Republican Congress controls the power of the purse, Obama has not lost a single major policy battle since Cong Boehner became Speaker of the House in 2010; in fact, Obama is delighted with Boehner’s Speakership. On July 3rd, when Obama signed the Unconstitutional SECRET TPP/TPA bills into law, Boehner and McConnell were nowhere to be found, they were hiding during the signing ceremony, that law is a thorn in the side of every American voter who worked tirelessly to give the US House a conservative majority.

Both Democrat and Republican Congressmen received of over $200 million in payments from the International Chamber of Commerce to vote for the TPA Bill (the US Chamber of Commerce is no longer a US Chamber, most members are now anti-American foreign corporations who control the Speaker and the Senate Majority Leader with financial payoffs). If the TPA Bill hadn’t passed, the provisions in the SECRET TPP Bill stated it would not have become effective. Millions of dollars in payments that were paid to members of Congress by the International Chamber of Commerce as outlined in the below listed article, bribed Congressmen.

Speaker Boehner received $5.3 million, Cong Ryan received $2.4 million, and it was reported that McConnell received $9 million to ram TTP thru Congress for Obama. Their complicity and close cooperation with Obama, Pelosi, and Reid is what guaranteed the payoffs of millions of dollars to them; there support for TPP/TPA will result in permit Obama to bring in millions of non-Christian Illegal Aliens from 50 countries (including Mexico) to enter and work in the US. Millions of Illegal Aliens added to the 20 million Illegal aliens already here, will destabilizing the US unemployed work force of 104 million Americans, and strike another blow to the Free Enterprise System.

Millions of Illegal Aliens from 50 countries will be able unfairly compete with 104 million unemployed Americans and 46 million Americans on Food Stamps, because 5 or 6 illegals co-habituating in the same apartment, will be able to work at a much lower wages than Americans can afford to do. Unlimited entry of foreign workers into the US, with no background investigations, to determine if they have terrorist ties, will continue to violate Federal Immigration Laws (ISIS Radical Islamic Terrorists have let it be known that they plan to enter the US using the TPP as cover).

The FBI recently informed Congress that over 200 Muslim immigrants, who were put on a fast track for US Citizenship by Obama, are now fighting with ISIS killing Christians in Iraq. Because the SECRET TPP passed, the massive pending entry of illegal aliens will effectively eliminate US Immigration controls, because a percentage of the millions of foreigners whose backgrounds will not be reviewed for terrorist ties, will pose a very serious terrorist threat to the National Security of the United States, the SECRET TPP/TPA Law is not only leaving the porous Southern Border wide open, but has effectively eliminating “all” US Borders.

Congressional sources reported that Boehner has withheld millions of dollars of campaign support for conservatives Congressmen who voted in favor of their constituents conscious and refused to support TPP. In some cases, Congressmen lost assignments, or were ridiculed, mocked, and relentlessly pressured because they wouldn’t vote for the SECRET Unconstitutional TPP Bill, or the TPA Bill——-very few Congressmen who voted for the TPP Bill even read it’s 800 pages.

We object to the way that Speaker Boehner and Cong Ryan met out punishment against some of the endorsed and elected Combat Veterans For Congress who didn’t toe the line, but instead, voted against the unconstitutional 800 page SECRET TPP/TPA Bills. They voted against it because it violated the Constitutional authority of Congress, violated US Sovereignty of the United States in favor of International Tribunals, opposed it because no American citizen has ever been allowed to read what is in the SECRET TPP Law, and they opposed Cong Paul Ryan’s steady stream of misinformation about what he was alleging was in the Unconstitutional SECRET TPP bill and the TPA Bill.

The following Combat Veterans For Congress refused to support that Unconstitutional and SECRET TPP Bill:

Cong Duncan D. Hunter, Maj-USMCR (R-CA-50)

Cong Steve Pearce, Capt-USAF (R-NM-2)

Cong Paul Cook, Col-USMC (R-CA-8)

Cong Chris Gibson, Col-USA (R-NY-20)

Cong Scott Perry, Col/PA-ARNG (R-PA-4)

Cong Steve Russell, LTC-USA (Ret) (Ranger) (R-OK-5)

Cong James Bridenstine, Lcdr-USNR (R-OK-1)

The new TPP Law is not and has never has been about “Free Trade”, the nation already had “Free Trade” without the need for the 800 page SECRET TPP Bill, and the 196 page TPA Bill that the a plurality of members of Congress never read before they voted for them. The American voters should ask their Congressmen on this Congressional recess why the TTIP and the TISA portions of both Bills are still being cloaked in SECRECY, even after they were signed into law on July 3rd. The US Government is a Republic, not a dictatorship run by 5 individuals (Obama, Boehner, McConnell, Pelosi, and Reid). In 2016, the American voters should elect new members of Congress who then elect leaders of congress who will protect and defend the US Constitution from the repeated assault by the Caucus of Progressives, Leftist, Marxists, and Communist members of Congress.

Speaker Boehner and Leader McConnell not only betrayed the American voters for millions of dollars in payoffs, but they fully funded Obamacare, funded the amnesty for 5 million Illegal aliens Obama planned to give alimony to, funded the federal Common Core curriculum pushing it into American schools thru the 50 State Education Departments, continue to refuse to enact legislation to close the wide open southern border, have never opposed Obama’s use of tax payers dollars to cover the cost of the UN Resettlement Program for hundreds of thousands of Muslims while excluding the resettlement of over 300,000 Christians fleeing ISIS genocide in the Greek Catholic Refugee Program, have struck a secret deal with Pelosi & Reid to give Congress special exemptions from Obamacare, and have not used the power of the purse to prevent Obama from degrading the strength of the US Armed Forces to levels below the level of strength they had prior to WWI. The Congressional leadership has failed to oppose Obama’s devastating “Changes” in America’s family values and the US Armed Forces; the American voters should insist that their Congressmen make “Change” in the leadership of Congress, and elect leaders who will oppose the devastating Socialist “Changes” Obama has been making in the Republic.

The Congressional leaders allowed Obama to reverse the Constitution safeguards, put in place by the Founding Fathers, the require a 2/3 vote of Congress, in order to pass the Iranian International Nuclear Weapons Treaty. Instead they reversed that process and are now requiring a 2/3 vote of Congress, in order to be able to defeat the flawed Iranian International Nuclear Weapons Treaty (while permitting Obama to call the International Treaty an Agreement). The American voters should ask their Congressmen on this Congressional recess why they allowed the Constitutional safeguards to be reversed by the Congressional leaders.

Copyright 2015, Capt. Joseph R. John. All Rights Reserved. This material can only be posted on another Web site or distributed on the Internet by giving full credit to the author. It may not be published, broadcast, or rewritten without permission from the author.

Joseph R. John, USNA ‘62

Capt USN(Ret)

Former FBI/ Reagan Administration Alumnus

2307 Fenton Parkway, Suite 107-184

San Diego, CA 92108

Fax: (619) 220-0109

Then I heard the voice of the Lord, saying, “Whom shall I send, and who will go for Us?” Then I said, “Here am I. Send me!” -Isaiah 6:8

______________________________________________________________________________________________________

Almost $200 Million Donated to Representatives to Pass TPA

June 16, 2015 Paola Casale

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Many think our government is for sale. However, by taking a look at the facts below provided by the Open Secrets, it is easy to understand where they are coming from. Looking back at Friday the 12th, the House voted on Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), the controversial bill that gives power to the executive branch to negotiate treaties. TPA limit’s Congress’ ability to better a trade deal by subjecting members of Congress to 90 days of reviewing the trade agreement, prohibiting any amendments on the implementing legislation, and giving them an up or down vote. TPA passed with a mere 219-211 vote with only 218 needed to pass. The real shocker comes from the amount of money each Representative received for a yes vote. In total, $197,869,145 was given to Representatives for a yes vote where as $23,065,231 was given in opposition.

John Boehner (R-OH) received $5.3 million for a “yea” vote and was the highest paid legislator.
Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) received $2.4 million for his “yea” vote.
Paul Ryan (R-WI) received $2.4 million for a “yea” vote and came in at the third highest paid legislator.
Pat Tiberi (R-OH) follows Paul Ryan, coming in the fourth spot having received $1.6 million for his “yea” vote.

The fifth highest paid legislator is somewhat of a “hero” in comparison to others. Representative Steny Hoyer (D-MD) received $1.6 million for a yes vote and only $282,710 for a no vote. Despite of his high contribution from those in favor of TPA, he still voted a solid nay. However 28 Democrats joined Boehner to vote for TPA and were financially rewarded by the Chamber of Commerce.

House Democrats to call before Fast Track Vote

We also have real Democratic and Republican hero stories.

Joe Crowley (D-NY) was offered 1.3 million for a “yea” vote and only $72,550 for a “nay” vote and he still voted against TPA.
Patrick Murphy (D-FL) was offered 1.1 million for a “yea” vote and only $213,360 for a “nay” vote and still voted against it.
Richard Neal D(MA) was offered $1.1 million for a “yea” vote and a mere $47,625 for a “nay” vote and still voted against it.

Mick Mulvaney (R-SC) was offered $541,746 for a “yea” vote and no money at all for a “nay” vote and he still voted “nay!”
Andy Harris (R-MD) was offered $254,803 for a “yea” vote and no money at all for a “nay” vote and he still voted “nay”.
Thomas Massie (R-KY) was offered $250,328 for a “yea” vote and no money at all for a “nay” vote and he still voted “nay.”
Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) was offered $180,832 for a “yea” vote and no money at all for a “nay vote” and he still voted “nay.”

Where did this kind of money come from? Those in favor of TPA were Security Brokers and Investment Companies who donated a whopping $11.3 million dollars for a “yea” vote. Or big banking companies who donated $10.1 million dollars. In other words, Wall Street hashed out millions and millions of dollars to push for the passage of TPA.

Those numbers are absolutely staggering. Corporations are taking control of what policies are approved or blocked in the U.S. We cannot sit around while corporations decide what is “good” for America or not! This is a democracy, not a plutocracy! Contact your representatives and let them know that you do not want them to vote in favor of TPA!

January 9, 2015

While Paris Burns, Obama’s apptee gets set to import 70,000 Muslims into USA [nc]

Joseph R. John
To
‘USBPSSA Robert M. Trent, (Ret) (WO2/ANG/USMC)’
Today at 3:55 PM

Bob, Thank you. We believe the below listed Assistant Director USCIS will most likely rubber stamp the entry of 70,000 Muslim refugees from Syria without properly completing the necessary background investigation on each refugee to determines if their acceptance would endanger the National Security interest of the United States. Her department doesn’t have the thousands of well-trained intelligence analyst required to do the in depth background investigation on each refugee.

Obama has quietly agreed to resettle 70,000 Muslim refugees throughout the US as part of the UN Resettlement Program, and is putting the refugees on a fast track for US citizenship; the Obama administration has accepted more Muslims than all the other nations in the world combined. These new Muslim immigrants are posing a major security risk, will cost $10 billion to resettle, and some of the Muslim immigrants may have previously joined ISIL. Some of the Somalis that were on the fast track program, and received US citizenship have already gone to fight for ISIL in Syria and when they return will pose a serious threat to the United States. It has been reported that Al Q’ieda is infiltrating the UN Resettlement Program to obtain legal acceptance as US citizens in the US.

In addition, DHS’s Immigration Service will approve the issuance of Social Security numbers and work permits to 5 million Illegal aliens, without doing the proper investigation required to determine if the 5 million illegal aliens have resided in the US for 5 year, are not convicted criminals, or have any terrorist links. The Obama administration has rented new office space, and is are hiring 1000 new employees, with no experience, to accomplish the detailed review and processing of each Illegal alien. If each of the 1000 new employees reviewed 5 illegal aliens each day on a 5 day week, it would normally take over 4 years to process the 5 million Illegal aliens, but those new employees will be directed to rubber stamp each application with little or no investigation, and it won’t take 4 years to process them.

It is very dangerous for the National Security interest of the United States to issue social security numbers and work permits for 5 million Illegal aliens and fast track 70,000 Muslim refugees for US citizenship without doing the in proper depth background investigations on each individual, in order to determine if they are convicted felons, involved in drug smuggling, and to determine if they have terrorist ties. The Obama administration seems to be approving one program after another that is destabilizing the National Security interest of the Republic

Respectfully,

Joe

Joseph R. John, USNA ‘62

Capt USN(Ret)

Chairman, Combat Veterans For Congress PAC

2307 Fenton Parkway, Suite 107-184

San Diego, CA 92108

Fax: (619) 220-0109

http://www.CombatVeteransForCongress.org

Then I heard the voice of the Lord, saying, “Whom shall I send, and who will go for Us?” Then I said, “Here am I. Send me!”
-Isaiah 6:8

From: Robert Trent [mailto:roberttrent1@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2015 6:25 PM
To: aaa aaa
Subject: Assistant Director USCIS

See where we are going…

MEET OUR NEW ASST DIRECTOR FOR US CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION…

Another “qualified” appointment by BO in Homeland Security. No doubt she’ll be essential to his Muslim immigration efforts.

Unfortunately, this is true and she is another unqualified, inexperienced Obama appointee!!

http://www.snopes.com/politics/obama/fatimanoor.asp

Meet Fatima Noor, President Obama’s latest appointment to a high level position in the Department of Homeland IN-Security, the post of Assistant Director for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration.

cid:4EF6A03A-BFE7-4E1E-BB41-7EC7ECC9E0C7

Ms. Noor has little if any experience in the compliance or enforcement fields. Her total experience in government related work is limited

to volunteer work with World Relief Memphis and as activities coordinator the Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition.

She majored in psychology with minors in Spanish and Arabic international relations.

She recently completed a month-long research fellowship in Muslim psychology hosted by Carnegie-Mellon and the University of Pittsburgh, yes you read that correctly . an entire month long research fellowship ; her research will be ongoing as part of her work the DHS.

No, this is not a joke.

December 7, 2014

From 1939, Thanks to Butch and www.vonmises.org [c]

Hard to believe this was written in 1939.

The Criminality of the State

http://mises.org/library/criminality-state

·

·

DECEMBER 29, 2006Albert Jay Nock

TAGS Big GovernmentWar and Foreign PolicyInterventionism

[This essay first appeared in The American Mercury in March 1939.]

As well as I can judge, the general attitude of Americans who are at all interested in foreign affairs is one of astonishment, coupled with distaste, displeasure, or horror, according to the individual observer’s capacity for emotional excitement. Perhaps I ought to shade this statement a little in order to keep on the safe side, and say that this is the most generally expressed attitude.

All our institutional voices — the press, pulpit, forum — are pitched to the note of amazed indignation at one or another phase of the current goings-on in Europe and Asia. This leads me to believe that our people generally are viewing with wonder as well as repugnance certain conspicuous actions of various foreign States; for instance, the barbarous behavior of the German State towards some of its own citizens; the merciless despotism of the Soviet Russian State; the ruthless imperialism of the Italian State; the “betrayal of CzechoSlovakia” by the British and French States; the savagery of the Japanese State; the brutishness of the Chinese State’s mercenaries; and so on, here or there, all over the globe — this sort of thing is showing itself to be against our people’s grain, and they are speaking out about it in wrathful surprise.

I am cordially with them on every point but one. I am with them in repugnance, horror, indignation, disgust, but not in astonishment. The history of the State being what it is, and its testimony being as invariable and eloquent as it is, I am obliged to say that the naive tone of surprise wherewith our people complain of these matters strikes me as a pretty sad reflection on their intelligence. Suppose someone were impolite enough to ask them the gruff question, “Well, what do you expect?” — what rational answer could they give? I know of none.

Polite or impolite, that is just the question which ought to be put every time a story of State villainy appears in the news. It ought to be thrown at our public day after day, from every newspaper, periodical, lecture platform, and radio station in the land; and it ought to be backed up by a simple appeal to history, a simple invitation to look at the record. The British State has sold the Czech State down the river by a despicable trick; very well, be as disgusted and angry as you like, but don’t be astonished; what would you expect? — just take a look at the British State’s record! The German State is persecuting great masses of its people, the Russian State is holding a purge, the Italian State is grabbing territory, the Japanese State is buccaneering along the Asiatic Coast; horrible, yes, but for Heaven’s sake don’t lose your head over it, for what would you expect? — look at the record!

That is how every public presentation of these facts ought to run if Americans are ever going to grow up into an adult attitude towards them. Also, in order to keep down the great American sin of self-righteousness, every public presentation ought to draw the deadly parallel with the record of the American State. The German State is persecuting a minority, just as the American State did after 1776; the Italian State breaks into Ethiopia, just as the American State broke into Mexico; the Japanese State kills off the Manchurian tribes in wholesale lots, just as the American State did the Indian tribes; the British State practices large-scale carpetbaggery, like the American State after 1864; the imperialist French State massacres native civilians on their own soil, as the American State did in pursuit of its imperialistic policies in the Pacific, and so on.

In this way, perhaps, our people might get into their heads some glimmering of the fact that the State’s criminality is nothing new and nothing to be wondered at. It began when the first predatory group of men clustered together and formed the State, and it will continue as long as the State exists in the world, because the State is fundamentally an anti-social institution, fundamentally criminal. The idea that the State originated to serve any kind of social purpose is completely unhistorical. It originated in conquest and confiscation — that is to say, in crime. It originated for the purpose of maintaining the division of society into an owning-and-exploiting class and a propertyless dependent class — that is, for a criminal purpose.

No State known to history originated in any other manner, or for any other purpose. Like all predatory or parasitic institutions, its first instinct is that of self-preservation. All its enterprises are directed first towards preserving its own life, and, second, towards increasing its own power and enlarging the scope of its own activity. For the sake of this it will, and regularly does, commit any crime which circumstances make expedient. In the last analysis, what is the German, Italian, French, or British State now actually doing? It is ruining its own people in order to preserve itself, to enhance its own power and prestige, and extend its own authority; and the American State is doing the same thing to the utmost of its opportunities.

What, then, is a little matter like a treaty to the French or British State? Merely a scrap of paper — Bethmann-Hollweg[i] described it exactly. Why be astonished when the German or Russian State murders its citizens? The American State would do the same thing under the same circumstances. In fact, eighty years ago it did murder a great many of them for no other crime in the world but that they did not wish to live under its rule any longer; and if that is a crime, then the colonists led by G. Washington were hardened criminals and the Fourth of July is nothing but a cutthroat’s holiday.

The weaker the State is, the less power it has to commit crime. Where in Europe today does the State have the best criminal record? Where it is weakest: in Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Sweden, Monaco, Andorra. Yet when the Dutch State, for instance, was strong, its criminality was appalling; in Java it massacred 9,000 persons in one morning which is considerably ahead of Hitler’s record or Stalin’s. It would not do the like today, for it could not; the Dutch people do not give it that much power, and would not stand for such conduct. When the Swedish State was a great empire, its record, say from 1660 to 1670, was fearful. What does all this mean but that if you do not want the State to act like a criminal, you must disarm it as you would a criminal; you must keep it weak. The State will always be criminal in proportion to its strength; a weak State will always be as criminal as it can be, or dare be, but if it is kept down to the proper limit of weakness — which, by the way, is a vast deal lower limit than people are led to believe — its criminality may be safely got on with.

So it strikes me that instead of sweating blood over the iniquity of foreign States, my fellow-citizens would do a great deal better by themselves to make sure that the American State is not strong enough to carry out the like iniquities here. The stronger the American State is allowed to grow, the higher its record of criminality will grow, according to its opportunities and temptations. If, then, instead of devoting energy, time, and money to warding off wholly imaginary and fanciful dangers from criminals thousands of miles away, our people turn their patriotic fervor loose on the only source from which danger can proceed, they will be doing their full duty by their country.

Two able and sensible American publicists — Isabel Paterson, of the New York Herald Tribune, and W.J. Cameron, of the Ford Motor Company — have lately called our public’s attention to the great truth that if you give the State power to do something for you, you give it an exact equivalent of power to do something to you. I wish every editor, publicist, teacher, preacher, and lecturer would keep hammering that truth into American heads until they get it nailed fast there, never to come loose. The State was organized in this country with power to do all kinds of things for the people, and the people in their short-sighted stupidity, have been adding to that power ever since. After 1789, John Adams said that, so far from being a democracy of a democratic republic, the political organization of the country was that of “a monarchical republic, or, if you will, a limited monarchy”; the powers of its President were far greater than those of “an avoyer, a consul, a podesta, a doge, a stadtholder; nay, than a king of Poland; nay, than a king of Sparta.” If all that was true in 1789 — and it was true — what is to be said of the American State at the present time, after a century and a half of steady centralization and continuous increments of power?

Power, for instance, to “help business” by auctioning off concessions, subsidies, tariffs, land grants, franchises; power to help business by ever encroaching regulations, supervisions, various forms of control. All this power was freely given; it carried with it the equivalent power to do things to business; and see what a banditti of sharking political careerists are doing to business now! Power to afford “relief” to proletarians; and see what the State has done to those proletarians now in the way of systematic debauchery of whatever self-respect and self-reliance they may have had! Power this way, power that way; and all ultimately used against the interests of the people who surrendered that power on the pretext that it was to be used for those interests.

Many now believe that with the rise of the “totalitarian” State the world has entered upon a new era of barbarism. It has not. The totalitarian State is only the State; the kind of thing it does is only what the State has always done with unfailing regularity, if it had the power to do it, wherever and whenever its own aggrandizement made that kind of thing expedient. Give any State like power hereafter, and put it in like circumstances, and it will do precisely the same kind of thing. The State will unfailingly aggrandize itself, if only it has the power, first at the expense of its own citizens, and then at the expense of anyone else in sight. It has always done so, and always will.

The idea that the State is a social institution, and that with a fine upright man like Mr. Chamberlain at the head of it, or a charming person like Mr. Roosevelt, there can be no question about its being honorably and nobly managed — all this is just so much sticky flypaper. Men in that position usually make a good deal of their honor, and some of them indeed may have some (though if they had any I cannot understand their letting themselves be put in that position) but the machine they are running will run on rails which are laid only one way, which is from crime to crime. In the old days, the partition of CzechosLovakia or the taking-over of Austria would have been arranged by rigmarole among a few highly polished gentlemen in stiff shirts ornamented with fine ribbons. Hitler simply arranged it the way old Frederick arranged his share in the first partition of Poland; he arranged the annexation of Austria the way Louis XIV arranged that of Alsace. There is more or less of a fashion, perhaps, in the way these things are done, but the point is that they always come out exactly the same in the end.

Furthermore, the idea that the procedure of the “democratic” State is any less criminal than that of the State under any other fancy name, is rubbish. The country is now being surfeited with journalistic garbage about our great sister democracy, England, its fine democratic government, its vast beneficent gift for ruling subject peoples, and so on; but does anyone ever look up the criminal record of the British State? The bombardment of Copenhagen; the Boer War; the Sepoy Rebellion; the starvation of Germans by the post-Armistice blockade; the massacre of natives in India, Afghanistan, Jamaica; the employment of Hessians to kill off American colonists. What is the difference, moral or actual, between Kitchener’s democratic concentration camps[ii] and the totalitarian concentration camps maintained by Herr Hitler? The totalitarian general Badoglio[iii] is a pretty hard-boiled brother, if you like, but how about the democratic general O’Dwyer[iv] and Governor Eyre[v]? Any of the three stands up pretty well beside our own democratic virtuoso, Hell Roaring Jake Smith,[vi] in his treatment of the Filipinos; and you can’t say fairer than that.

As for the British State’s talent for a kindly and generous colonial administration, I shall not rake up old scores by citing the bill of particulars set forth in the Declaration of Independence; I shall consider India only, not even going into matters like the Kaffir war or the Wairau incident in New Zealand. Our democratic British cousins in India in the Eighteenth Century must have learned their trade from Pizarro and Cortez. Edmund Burke called them “birds of prey and passage.” Even the directors of the East India Company admitted that “the vast fortunes acquired in the inland trade have been obtained by a scene of the most tyrannical and oppressive conduct that was ever known in any age or country.” Describing a journey, Warren Hastings wrote that “most of the petty towns and serais were deserted at our approach”; the people ran off into the woods at the mere sight of a white man. There was the iniquitous salt monopoly; there was extortion everywhere, practiced by enterprising rascals in league with a corrupt police; there was taxation which confiscated almost half the products of the soil.

If it be said that Britain was not a sister democracy in those days, and has since reformed, one might well ask how much of the reformation is due to circumstances, and how much to a change of heart. Besides, the Black-and-Tans[vii] were in our day; so was the post-Armistice blockade; General O’Dwyer’s massacre was not more than a dozen years ago;[viii] and there are plenty alive who remember Kitchener’s concentration camps.

No, “democratic” State practice is nothing more or less than State practice. It does not differ from Marxist State practice, Fascist State practice, or any other. Here is the Golden Rule of sound citizenship, the first and greatest lesson in the study of politics: you get the same order of criminality from any State to which you give power to exercise it; and whatever power you give the State to do things for you carries with it the equivalent power to do things to you. A citizenry which has learned that one short lesson has but little more left to learn.

Stripping the American State of the enormous power it has acquired is a full-time job for our citizens and a stirring one; and if they attend to it properly they will have no energy to spare for fighting communism, or for hating Hitler, or for worrying about South America or Spain, or for anything whatever, except what goes on right here in the United States.

Editor’s Notes

[i] Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (November 29, 1856 – January 1, 1921) was a German politician and statesman who served as Chancellor of the German Empire from 1909 to 1917. He was particularly upset by Britain’s declaration of war following German violation of Belgium’s neutrality in the course of her invasion of France, reportedly asking the departing British Ambassador Goschen how Britain could go to war over a “mere scrap of paper” (the Belgian Neutrality Treaty of 1839).

[ii] Horatio Herbert Kitchener (24 June 1850 – 5 June 1916) was an Irish-born British Field Marshal, diplomat and statesman. During the Second Boer War (1899–1902), Kitchener’s policy was to destory Boer farms and move civilians into concentration camps whose conditions led to wide opprobrium in Britain and Europe.

[iii] General Pietro Badoglio succeeded Benito Mussolini as Prime Minister of Italy (Provisional Military Government), from July 25, 1943 to June 18, 1944.

[iv] Sir Michael Francis O’Dwyer (April 1864 – March 13, 1940), was Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab from 1912 to 1919, where he oversaw the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre on April 13, 1919. According to official figures, 379 unarmed civilians were killed by Gurkha troops. Unofficial estimates place the figure much higher, at perhaps 2,000, with many more wounded. In the wake of the massacre O’Dwyer was relieved of his office.

[v] Edward John Eyre (5 August 1815 – 30 November 1901) was an English land explorer of the Australian continent and a controversial Governor of Jamaica, where he ruthlessly suppressed the Morant Bay Rebellion, and had many black peasants killed. He also authorized the judicial murder of George William Gordon, a mixed-race member of the colonial assembly who was suspected of involvement in the insurrection. These events created great controversy in Britain, leading to calls for Eyre to be arrested and tried for Gordon’s murder. John Stuart Mill organized the Jamaica Committee — comprised of such classical liberals as John Bright and Herbert Spencer — calling for his prosecution. Eyre was twice charged with murder, but the cases never proceeded.

[vi] General Jacob Hurd Smith (1840–1918) was a veteran of the Wounded Knee massacre and well known among Indian campaigners. As brigadier general in charge of the Samar campaign in the Philippine-American War (1899–1913), Smith became infamous for his orders to “kill everyone over the age of ten” and make the island “a howling wilderness.” He was dubbed “Hell Roaring Jake” Smith, “The Monster”, and “Howling Jake” by the newspapers.

[vii] The term “Black and Tans” refers to the Royal Irish Constabulary Reserve Force, which was one of two paramilitary forces employed by the Royal Irish Constabulary from 1920 to 1921, to suppress revolution in Ireland by targeting the IRA and Sinn Féin.

[viii] On March 13, 1940 — one year after Nock published this essay — Punjabi revolutionary Udham Singh shot O’Dwyer dead in Caxton Hall in London as an act of revenge for the massacre.

[Both “The Albany Plan Re-Visited” and TAPR 2nd Edition, solve this problem in the section on Federal Authority and Citizenship. Of the three ways to curtail this form of federal criminality, only Secession may be peaceful. The other two require an armed revolution or insurrection as one, and the other is conquest by an outside force. Both are violent, bloody, and expensive. Secession.]

October 21, 2014

UN/Obama Arms Limitations threaten Israel, Republic of China, and YOU

Joseph R. John
To
jrj@combatveteransforcongress.org
Sep 12

The assault on Americans Citizen’s rights to own and bear arms in accordance with provisions of the Second Amendment of the US Constitution is being threatened by the Obama administration’s support for the UN Small Arms Treaty This UN Small-Arms Treaty threatens individual firearm ownership with an invasive registration scheme.

The below listed Op-Ed by Admiral James A Lyons’52 USN (Ret) (former Commander of the US Pacific Fleet and the Senior US Military Representative to the United Nations) is a warning all Americans of the threat ;posed by Obama to void provisions of the Second Amendment by signing the UN Small-Arms Treaty, allowing the UN to control small arms in the United States.

Obama has the support of the elected Democrat Senators to approve the UN Small Arms Treaty. Those Democrat Senators who agree with Obama, standing for re-election in November should be defeated at the polls. The endorsed Combat Veterans For Congress in the attachment, running for election in 2014 (three of whom are running for the US Senate), support the rights of all Americans to acquire and bear arms in accordance with the US Constitution. .

Joseph R. John, USNA ‘62

Capt USN(Ret)

Chairman, Combat Veterans For Congress PAC

2307 Fenton Parkway, Suite 107-184

San Diego, CA 92108

Fax: (619) 220-0109

http://www.CombatVeteransForCongress.org

Then I heard the voice of the Lord, saying, “Whom shall I send, and who will go for Us?” Then I said, “Here am I. Send me!”
-Isaiah 6:8

From: Adm James A. Lyons, Jr
Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2014 6:19 AM
To: Joseph R. John
Subject: Op-Ed – Small-arms treaty, big Second Amendment threat

My latest op-ed published in the Washington Times today.

All The Best
Ace

James A. Lyons, Jr.
Admiral, USN (ret)
President/CEO

LION Associates, LLC
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/16/lyons-small-arms-treaty-big-second-amendment-threa/#
LYONS: Small-arms treaty, big Second Amendment threat
Ceding Senate constitutional authority to the U.N. would be unwise

By James A. Lyons

Wednesday, July 16, 2014

Lost Gun Rights Illustration by Greg Groesch/The Washington Times

Enlarge Photo

Lost Gun Rights Illustration by Greg Groesch/The Washington Times more >

In a little-noticed action, the U.N. General Assembly on April 2, 2013, adopted by “majority vote” an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) with the objective of regulating the international trade in conventional arms from small arms to major military equipment. The treaty’s lofty objectives were to foster peace and security by limiting uncontrolled destabilizing arms transfer to areas of conflict. In particular, it was also meant to prevent countries that abuse human rights from acquiring arms.

While the record of the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty discussions makes no mention of it, the genesis for regulating the unrestrained transfer of conventional arms to conflict areas, Third World countries and human rights violators was a key policy of President Carter’s administration. Shortly after his inauguration in 1977, he initialed a policy of restraint on conventional-arms transfer and linked such control to the human rights record of potential recipients, particularly in Latin America. To implement this policy, the Carter administration proposed to the Soviet Union, the world’s second-leading supplier of arms, that it open negotiations to conclude such an agreement. These meetings were known as the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks.

The first region selected was Latin America, because there was less competition there than anywhere else in the world between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the director of political-military affairs, I was the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative in the U.S. delegation, which was headed by Les Gelb from the State Department. Suffice to say, after four meetings over a 12-month period and the “delusion” that a successful agreement could be achieved, the talks collapsed. The esoteric objectives may sound good in the faculty lounge, but they fail to pass muster in the real world.

The Soviets were always the reluctant suitors in this enterprise. They were not about to restrict the transfer of arms in areas that they viewed to be in their political interests. Certainly, there was not unanimity of purpose in the Carter administration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed the objectives as an unnecessary infringement on our strategy and sovereignty.

For the record, the Obama administration’s Conventional Arms Transfer policy issued on Jan. 16 embraces many of the objectives of the Carter administration’s policy, as well as the current U.N. Arms Trade Treaty. However, it makes no mention of either one.

A number of major defects in the U.N. treaty were detailed in a letter sent to President Obama in October 2013 by 50 senators — both Republicans and Democrats. The first problem was that the treaty was adopted by majority vote in the U.N. General Assembly, not by consensus, a condition called for by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. After entry into force, the senators contend, the Arms Trade Treaty can be amended by majority vote of signatory countries, effectively negating the Senate’s constitutional treaty power and handing it to foreign governments. Even the State Department concedes, the senators wrote, that the treaty “includes language that could hinder the United States from fulfilling its strategic, legal and moral commitments to provide arms to key allies such as the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the State of Israel.”

Of most concern is the infringement on our constitutional rights, the senators charged. The Arms Trade Treaty “includes only a weak nonbinding reference to the lawful ownership, use of, and trade in firearms, and recognizes none of these activities, much less individual self-defense, as fundamental individual rights.” When coupled with the treaty’s ceding of interpretive authority to other countries, this poses a direct threat to the Second Amendment.

It should be noted that neither of Virginia’s senators, Mark Warner or Tim Kaine, signed the Senate letter against a U.N. treaty that threatens Americans’ right to keep and bear arms, and undermines American sovereignty.

Failing to sign the letter is not the first time Mr. Warner went AWOL on the Arms Trade Treaty. In January 2013, before Secretary of State John F. Kerry signed the treaty, the Senate passed a budget amendment sponsored by Sen. James M. Inhofe, Oklahoma Republican, to establish a deficit-neutral reserve fund for the purpose of “upholding Second Amendment rights, which shall include preventing the United States from entering into the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty.” Mr. Warner and Mr. Kaine were among the 46 voting “nay” on the amendment.

Supporters of the treaty say there’s nothing to worry about, because the Second Amendment is a constitutional protection, and nothing in a treaty can undermine it. Gun rights champions strongly disagree. “The Obama administration is once again demonstrating its contempt for our fundamental, individual right to keep and bear arms,” said Chris W. Cox, executive director of the National Rifle Association’s Institute for Legislative Action, following Mr. Kerry’s signing of the treaty. “This treaty threatens individual firearm ownership with an invasive registration scheme. The NRA will continue working with the United States Senate to oppose ratification of the ATT.”

With 50 senators opposed to the Arms Trade Treaty, we can hope its prospects for Senate advice and consent are small — with or without the support of liberals such as Mr. Warner and Mr. Kaine. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also need to indicate clearly their concern, as it affect our strategy and sovereignty.

James A. Lyons, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, was commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations.

August 13, 2014

Secession: The Intermediate Argument, by and (c) Justplainbill

Secession: The Intermediate Argument
Posted: 14 August 2014
Introduction:

Fair Warning, this post is a relatively long post of several pages. It is not that I want to bore you. It is that the subject matter is not amenable to much more shortening.

When someone tells you that solving incredibly complex problems is easy or that there IS a quick solution, or they have the answer to all problems “in a nutshell,” and that person is not Jesus the Christ, then the odds are that they want you to buy something or vote them into office and “just trust them”. Think of “Hope and Change” as the mantra, yet not one reasonable suggestion is offered beyond “just trust me”.

For those uninterested in true argument or debate, there is a short post supporting the position of secession. This new post actually gives reasons, answers and the reasoned benefits of secession!

It may take a while for you to get to the end, but it is worth it if you really do want to preserve American Values. Just as an example, in the 1770’s, the supporting arguments for secession were published in pamphlets of scores of pages. As a standard academic ma-neuver, I am incorporating herein, two of the most important, Common Sense and The Rights of Man, both by Thomas Payne, by reference. Truly, y’all who are interested in free-dom, liberty, equality (ya, equality, not affirmative action or some other pseudonym for discrimination, bigotry and legalized theft – read the five virtues post for more), and pri-vate property & personal wealth, regardless of what you may think of these arguments, you should have and read more than once, both of those pamphlets.

With Dan Greenfield and Fred-on-Everything making the obvious points on Execu-tive Branch Scandals and Illegal Aliens Invading; Mark Levin and Sean Hannity professing Originialist Constitutionalism; Taxihack Depressions (on wordpress.com) reporting active black ops; Michael Savage and Glenn Beck talking Survivalism, John Beck, PhD proving visually the profound uselessness of most federal programs, and with nothing reasonable coming from “the ivy covered halls ofacademia”, except appeasement and the surrender of Western Civilization to Transnational Industrial Feudalism, occasionally called Statism, I have decided to enter as “a voice of reason,” even though this will not read as “reason” on the first or even the third reading.

This is not as emotional as you think, the conclusions are both reasonable and rea-soned.

Posted on this blog (www.justplainbill.wordpress.com) is a book list. There have been several good books, including Gasparino’s The Sellout, Jared Diamond’s Collapse, Brion McClanahan’s The Founding Fathers’ Guide to the Constitution, and Pauline Maier’s Ratification, The People Debate the Constitution, 1787 – 1788, published since the last update.

Of immediate interest, and y’all should have this anyway, is the leather-bound pock-et edition of The Constitution of the United States of America with the Declaration of Inde-pendence, FALL RIVER PRESS © 2012, NYC NY ISBN 978-1-4351-4553-5, interestingly enough, printed and bound in China. Common Sense is also available through the same publisher, in a similar leather bound booklet.

Y’all’s reference library should also have Edwin Meese III’s, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, ISBN 978-1-59698-001-3, if for no other reason than to see how the original intent of The Founders has been corrupted by the United States Supreme Court, almost since the beginning. Y’all should have it anyway as it is a comprehensive and understandable, at least to those with a 10th grade education, guide to what is NOW the law of the land as interpreted by SCOTUS, ignominiously ignored by congress, and implemented by the executive branch. As conflicted as SCOTUS has made it, Professor Maier’s work, Ratification – noted above, offsets the chaos, for those interested; otherwise, we are back to, understandably, secession, moreover, the 1776 kind of secession, too!

Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian Wars, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, de Tocqueville’s De-mocracy in America, and Freehling’s two works, Nullification, and Secession, (both having disappeared from book shelves during “The Clinton Years”), with Shelby Foote’s The Civil War: a narrative, are still the most important starting places for understanding the back-ground of why The Red States must secede.

This Secession MUST BE before the funded national debt exceeds twenty trillion U.S. dollars, (20T USD or $20,000,000,000,000.00) and the unfunded debt exceeds ninety trillion U.S. dollars (90T USD or $90,000,000,000,000.00). This debt crisis is on a national economy of less than fourteen trillion U.S dollars (14T USD or $14,000,000,000,000.00). I explain this statement later.

This is a debt to asset ratio of worse than 1:6!!!

Dodd-Franks’ asset tests (reserves) and the Basil III tests, used to determine the solvency of banks, would have declared The United States Bankrupt years ago, like Greece, closed it down, and sold off all of its assets and property, at bargain basement prices, probably less than ten cents on the dollar, to cover those debts; which is an absurdity. None-the-less, the standard that these pissant politicians apply to others, they fail to apply to themselves as they garner billions of dollars from the public treasury for themselves and their associates.

A simple glance at the accumulation of money by Nancy Pelosi, Dodd, Franks, the DNC contributor/ owners of Solyndra, and the Reid Family in Nevada, and the methods used, prove this point.

And, because of these things, we are left with Revolution/ Civil War, a Constitutional Convention, economic collapse and bankruptcy with an unemployment rate approaching 50%, delayed social implosion and its resulting anarchy to tyrannical governments, or Secession, my personal option if done before the debt becomes irre-deemable.

Argument:

I

The Preamble to The Constitution of The United States of America is NOT law. It is a statement of purpose. [We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America]. Notice the words emphasized by capitalization, and the sentence structure, notice that the constitution is FOR the United States. Notice that throughout the constitution, the word ‘state’ is capitalized as ‘State,’ thus proving the independence and sovereignty of each State; proving that they are not a subordinate division devised for the purposes of ease of suppression, oppression, and repression.

This is a statement of intent, not law, and not to be construed as law.

The Preamble is one of two looking glasses, through which we should be scrutinizing every activity of the federal government. If any action of the federal government does not further one of these stated interests, it should fail as violating the IXth and Xth Amendments. If those proposing such illegal actions are in federal government, those people should be deemed untrustworthy and unreliable by every citizen, and treated as such.

The second looking glass is that collection of works known as The Anti-Federalist Papers. The Anti-Federalist Papers were those arguments used against the ratification of the original seven articles. The Federalist Papers, predominantly written by Alexander Hamilton, ESQ., with contributions by James Madison, ESQ., and a handful by John Jay, ESQ., later the first Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, is a set of circular and specious reasoning, often used to justify or explain various clauses of the constitution.

Chronologically, and logically, The Federalist Papers should be ignored as having been displaced by The Bill of Rights. The sequence of events are: failure of The Articles of Confederation, the failed Annapolis Convention, the successful Philadelphia Convention, presentation to the states for ratification, argument where initially the press pushed The Federalist Papers and suppressed The Anti-Federalist Papers, the prospect of ratification failure, and then the acceptance of The Bill of Rights as the cost of ratification. The Federalist Papers are arguments for ratification WITHOUT THE TEN AMENDMENTS of The Bill of Rights. Thus, in order to interpret this constitution, it is The Anti-Federalist Papers which must be first looked to for understanding, and The Federalist Papers to be used ONLY when they are either not in conflict with the Anti-Federalist Papers, or where the AFP’s are silent on the subject.

Thus, more than one-half of all constitutional issues decided by The Supreme Court, by The Congress, and by The Executive, have been founded on the false premises of The Federalist Papers. The methods available to correct this are either that congress review ALL of these decisions and over-rule them by legislation, and thereby face a SCOTUS revolt, this revolt based on decisions such as Holy Trinity Church, (included below), and The Federalist Papers themselves, or SCOTUS, on its own Motion review and over-rule these rulings.

The likelihood of SCOTUS emasculating itself are nil and less than nil, especially giv-en Justice Bader-Ginsburg’s recent sexist ramblings and Justice Kagen’s published igno-rance of American History.

During George Washington’s presidency, The Executive frequently declared legisla-tive bills as unconstitutional. The understanding then was that congress would reconsider what President Washington sent them and either re-write or drop the bill. President Washington frequently took the opportunity to place his Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, and his Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, at odds writing responses to congress, then he would pick the one that suited his point of view, and return the bill to congress with the appropriate response. Hamilton frequently trumped Jefferson, thus, the Jobber High Federalist rutted road was ridden, and not the green pathway of the Yeoman-Farmer.

Congress will do nothing to change this, as members of congress are too intimately involved in accumulating personal wealth and power under this system, I will explain elsewhere how this dysfunction functions. The likes of Jackson, Rangel, Boehner, Pelosi, Reid, &c., will do nothing to jeopardize their own personal positions, even unto total de-struction of the society around them. There is a book, Throw them All Out, which details the dirty but legal transactions involved; consider the recent rash of convictions for corruption amongst the political aristocracy and their families.

Arguments made to have another constitutional convention or add 27+ amend-ments, the amending process as defined in Article V of the constitution, fail for several reasons. The first is, as noted elsewhere on this blog, that the electoral process has failed utterly. It has been corrupted to a point beyond cure. The election of Al Franken and the corruption in Noxubee County MS are the standard and not the exceptions such that fair representation, unbiased national interest, and altruism would be non-existent at this convention. The second major defense is the same as that made in 1860: the regional interests will suppress the national ones. The cliché, “All politics are local”, is too true to be ignored.

Only through the Red States seceding are all of those bad SCOTUS decisions removed from law.

A consideration of historical context and technology intrudes at this point. When originally ratified, the congress was designated to sit for only a few months out of the year, and, that it sit several months after the polling occurs because of primitive transportation technology. In 1788, there was no electricity and the steam engine, “Fulton’s Folly”, still years away. Bluntly, there was NO SUCH THING AS A LAME DUCK SESSION as we now know it, as congress had recessed and would not return until the Spring. Recess appointments were few and far between, but understandable when congress could be months away from sitting. Only through secession will Lame Ducks and Recess Appointments be eliminated! They are too ingrained into the political corruption of both major parties to be done away with in any other fashion.

With electricity, electronics, jet transportation, I-Phones, I-Glasses, internet access, &c., the reasons for lame duck and recess appointments completely disappear. With seces-sion and a new constitution, polling can take place on the 3rd Saturday of the 1st month of each quarter; certification of the election can take place within 5 working days; and a re-striction on laws and appointments during those 5 days included in the constitution, thereby completely eliminating the egregious, self-serving, irresponsibility of passing an unwanted law or giving the wrong person an appointment, when the next government would not do those things, especially if the issues surrounding those laws and appointments are what the election was about. Think about it: John Marshall and his entire line of High Federalist SCOTUS rulings would not exist if this had been the law in 1800!

Secession cures this disease.

I-a

There are seven Articles to the 17 September 1787 Constitution of The United States of America. Before 1866, “These United States” were what we were. A Union of In-dependent Nations with each State having its own constitution, not answerable beyond those restrictions explicit in the constitution, to a Federal Government, but to its citizens, and thus free to organize and live free, unoppressed, with the right to self-realization uninhibited by those living thousands of miles away.

The Federal Government, according to the IXth and Xth Amendments,(enacted as ten of twelve proposed Amendments, currently known as The Bill of Rights, on Wednes-day, 4 March 1789), was to be a junior partner in the triumvirate of, the federal govern-ment, We The People, and The States. [Amendment IX: The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. *** Amendment X: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.]

The ten sections of Article I of the 1787 Constitution establish, define, and restrict the Congress of These United States of America. They create the bicarmel legislature with the “lower” house as the’ house of commons,’ or of “We The People”, and the “upper” house that of THE STATES; not that of an electoral majority of we the people on an extended appointment of exalted, and aristocratic, position.

The XVIIth Amendment effectively eviscerates Article I §3 [The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years, and each Senator shall have one Vote. … .] and clearly violates both the IXth and Xth Amendments. It reduces State Sovereignty to nil, with ONLY Nullification +/or Secession, as a response to an overbearing or out of control federal government. [Shelby Foote has a decent discussion of this in The Civil War: a narrative both in the ante-bellum section and in the section discussing the aftermath of Antietam.] One only need look to the effects of “The Dream Act” and its complete abandonment of the Southern Border and the Governor of Texas having to call up his state’s militia to attempt to protect his citizenry, their lives and their society and private property & wealth.

The discussion of the effect of reducing the senate to little more than a House of Lords, was on partisan lines, with the typical political result: In the short term, it helped the majority party, in the long term it has afflicted the taxpayer with trillions of dollars of unnecessary, unwanted, and unconstitutional burdens, both social and economic. The very effect of having this House of Lords has been constant gridlock, with, for all of the yammering on the subject, little, if any, compromise in the legislative process. The purpose of the senate as put forth in McClanahan’s book was to act as a brake on the impetuousness of the House of Representatives, AND to REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL STATES!

With the senators elected by the general population instead of by the states’ legislatures, the senate no longer represents the States, but is now irrelevant. It reduces to near zero, the political strength of the citizens of the individual states and clumps them into a rural vs urban sewer of issue conflicts, winnable only by that group procreating the most rapidly, and, history shows us, destroying economic efficiency through socialist “safety net” programs, instead of the necessary self-reliance/ self-responsible of the Judeo-Christian Ethos.

This same purpose, protecting the interests of the States, is better served by the process of Nullification. Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison saw, and agreed to this, when they wrote and put forth The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Nullification, (there is a post on this blog discussing Nullification more fully), has been used as recently as 2014 by the various states. Three examples are California nullifying federal immigration law by creating sanctuary cities, Colorado nullifying federal illicit drug laws by legalizing the recreational use of Cannabis and the 2010 rejection of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, (aka PPACA or “Obamacare”) by the citizens of Missouri (by a margin of 70% – 30%).

Nullification as currently used, is another argument in favor of secession due to Article IV, [§1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And, the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved and the effects thereof. … .] Nullification is acceptable in California and Colorado, but not Missouri, ever wonder why?

Please note where and under what circumstances nullification is acceptable and not acceptable. In point of fact, legally and morally, SCOTUS should have taken this into account when ruling on various aspects of PPACA. The failure of SCOTUS to perform within the law, in and of itself, should be reason enough for secession. Due to various XVIIIth Century SCOTUS rulings, not only is tenure for life a facet of being a federal judge, but one may be suffering from dementia or extreme alcoholism, yet remain on the bench, AND THAT JUDGE OR JUSTICE’S RULINGS ARE STILL BINDING!

Thus, by their own actions, both SCOTUS and the entire senate have defeated the purpose of the constitution. Secession is the least objectionable response to such irresponsibility, to this assault on personal Faith, private property and personal wealth.

The need for the upper house to be placed, as originally intended by The Founders, back to the citizen-taxpayers of each, and every individual, INDEPENDENT, State, is shown every time a party official prevents national work from being performed. The current institution is nothing more than a millionaires’ club, with its purpose naught more than self-perpetration, and making their bubba’s rich. The “Black Hole” in Boston is an excellent example of this, as is the constant raiding of the Transportation Fund for projects like “light rail”, instead of roads and bridges, which was what the original enabling was for.

Consider further this little tidbit. The money for the Federal Transportation Fund is from a tax on gasoline. The reasoning was that since cars and trucks would be using the roads and bridges, car and truck owners should pay for the bridges and roads. Now, the gasoline tax must be raised so that members of congress can buy construction workers’ votes by spending the money on less effective projects that are more expensive like “light rail”. Interestingly enough, the 9 Aug 14 issue of The Economist, has an article on this very subject.

As to Secession, the Stanford Convention of 1814, where the New England States voted to remain in the Union, provided that The War of 1812 be ended, is only one of several secession conventions. Dr. Freehling’s work is excellent for those who actually want to research the issue. Suffice it to say that, the next secession was when Andrew Jackson and his Democratic Party so controlled the federal government that the South was so heavily taxed for “economic improvement,” (canals & railroads, special loans to industry – think Solyndra), and the benefits of all of these taxes given to the Northern states, that South Carolina did hold a convention and start the secession process. Former president John Q. Adams, then a senator from Massachusetts, intervened, and South Carolina did not secede and Jackson’s Tax Law was repealed! Think Obamacare!

Shortly thereafter, the third party candidate, Abraham Lincoln got elected to the executive, and the seven Deep South states seceded. Lincoln, arguably the worst president this country has ever had, [know anybody else who not only caused a civil war costing as much as The War of 1861 did in both lives and wealth; violate the constitution so many ways through executive decree {instituted an unconstitutional raising of an army, fired on States’ militias, took and hanged innocent hostages as a means of controlling citizens in occupied territories, instituted a draft without an act of congress, created an income tax specifically prohibited by the constitution – not made legal in this country until 3 February 1913 with the questionable ratification of the XVIth Amendment, invaded the Sovereign Commonwealth of Virginia, piratically boarded British commercial vessels and kidnapping private citizens under the protection of The Crown, and on and on} – BTW, Lincoln freed NO slaves, the XIIIth Amendment did that, and the discussion by his own cabinet as to the constitutionality of his Emancipation Proclamation shows it to be unconstitutional as it is not allowed even within the executive’s war powers, AS IT DEALS WITH THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY W/O DUE PROCESS (!!!), AN ISSUE ALREADY DECIDED BY SCOTUS, Scott vs Sanford, THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS NO SUCH AUTHORITY!!!], in direct violation to the constitution, congress was NOT in session, started to raise a Standing Army and threatened to “cross” Virginia with it in order to put down the legally seceding states.

Virginia and the three border states, then held secession conventions and decided to secede from the union. For the results of Lincoln’s unconstitutional acts, I direct your attention back to Mr. Foote’s excellent work. His discussion of how Missouri did not secede yet Lincoln’s general, Frèmont, invaded anyway, treating Missourians as subjugated serfs, the treatment of occupied territories by such union generals as Butcher Butler in New Orleans and the confiscation of private property sold for personal gain, are enlightening, to say the least.

Point being, secession was and is legal. Further proof, is that in 1854, then Repre-sentative from Illinois, that same A. Lincoln, made a speech on the floor of the House of Representatives declaring so, and that he understood the law to be so. And, consider that although called The American Revolution of 1776, it was, in both fact and law, a secession from the Hanoverian Crown!

A last point on Article I, the “just and proper” enabling clause, is always interpreted through the dark glass of the specious Federalist Papers. Since it has been shown that it should be viewed through both The Preamble and The Anti-Federalist Papers, every case that has supported this clause’s use to over-reach and extend federal authority, should be made null and void. Only through secession can all of those laws and SCOTUS decisions be removed.

I – b

Ok, here’s the simple view and clearly why the federal government must be limited to federal issues ONLY!!

A Congressman from Detroit wants special tax privileges for certain constituents. Lady Speaker wants an extension to an Interstate to go over land to which she and her husband have options to buy. They swap votes, each voting for the other’s special situation. The result:
A special section of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), based on the section of the constitution stating that the congress should be doing things to help commerce and science, is amended to include that any money lost from the start-up of a Hip-Hop/ Rap Record Label, shall be written off the investor’s Gross An-nual Income at 50:1. Thus, for every dollar lost on said record label start-up, the investor can take off $50.00 of income. The result is a boom of record labels in Detroit, creating proprie-tary jobs for in-laws, family, and friends, an economically mis-direction of economic resources, and an incredibly favorable tax break for those specific investors.

Balancing this congressional support for advancing commerce and science, Madame Speaker, knowing months in advance of the public exactly where the unnecessary Interstate extension will go, exercises her options to buy hundreds of acres of land at $180/acre, and then sells it to The Department of Transportation for $1,800/acre.

Both the Congressman from Detroit and the Congresswoman from San Francisco, have personally, AND LEGALLY, profited from these acts of congress. We, the taxpayers, have lost. We have lost in the one case by being over-charged for the land, and in the other in that those “losses” have reduced the “investors’” tax payments.
Is this simple enough for you?

II

Article II establishes, defines, authorizes, and restricts, The Executive Branch.

In a full-blown argument including Article II, discussion of presidential over-reach, appointing of bubba’s, failure to enforce the law, &c., would be gone into. However, with all of the public discussion, or lack thereof, regarding The Obama Administration and its scandals, its appointments of racists and bigots such as Perez and Holder; scandals such as NSA spying on US citizens, the IRS, Benghazi, Hillary & Kerry, the dropping of the New Black Panther Voting Violation law suit, its failure to enforce the Mississippi Federal Court Decision regarding the Sheriff of Noxubee County, the as yet unexhausted abuse of the military, the continuing exercise of executive authority to change passed legislation without returning to the legislature for a re-write, the “Dream Act” executive order, the deaths of Federal Agents by foreigners, &c. I see no such need. The only way to re-write The Executive and get rid of all of the entrenched civil servants like Lois Lerner, is through secession.

Let us be more clear: Obama has appointed over three dozen ACLU and La Raza attorneys to the Justice Department Civil Rights Division, how impartial will they be, when J. Christian Adams’ book Injustice: the Obama Justice Department, already shows how bad things are in the DoJ. The evidence mounts.

And, as to the whole civil service, the over One Million of Them, what shall be done now? How many of them are Lois Lerners?

Bluntly, if even one is a Lois Lerner, the integrity of the whole system fails. Only se-cession cures the cancer of the Obamacratic Bureaucracy. Or, do you really think that Lois Lerner was (she got to retire with full pension and benefits) the only rotten apple in the bureaucracy, or that only the IRS, NSA, CIA, SSA, HUD, OPM, NLRB, ACE, Medicare, and the VA, are the only really bad federal agencies? Mmm, wait a minute, doesn’t that leave ONLY the Military as honest? And, hasn’t Obama fired so many generals and admirals that the only people appointed to flag positions are those with good records on gender, race, and affirmative action, pretty much leaving combat skills out of the promotion equation? Or, did I miss something in the recent speech by The Commandant of The Marine Corps (Barry, the P is silent!) condemning current Executive Policies?

III

The failure of The Supreme Court of the United States, created by Article III, to follow even the most basic of The Rules of Contract and Statutory Construction, that every person who has completed their first year of law school, not only understands the rule but the WHY the rule exists reasoning, is, in and of itself, reason to secede. The failure to follow the most simple of the rules of law, proves beyond any doubt that The Federal Judiciary is incapable of being impartial, of rendering a constitutionally grounded ruling, or even of acting on the surface in a non-partisan, reasoned judgmental manner.

When PPACA was ruled constitutional as a tax and CJ Roberts declared that the duty of SCOTUS is not to make law, but to interpret law in accordance with the intent of congress, he was correct. That he completely ignored the affirmed and boldly broadcast intent of congress, was NOT correct. Madame Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, had declared openly, and had printed in The Congressional Record, the official source and record of congressional intent, that there was not to be a severability clause in PPACA. She said outright that PPACA was an all or nothing bill, and was to be an all or nothing law. When SCOTUS ruled one iota of the law unconstitutional, the will of congress was that then the entire law was to be unconstitutional!

But there is so much more!

The chain of Marshall Cases beginning with Marbury vs Madison, (~1803) all in vio-lation of a clear reading of the constitution, has as its purpose a re-write of the constitution along High Federalist lines, and gives SCOTUS a higher footing than the other two branches, when the original intent was that it be the least of the three branches. The overt end of that line is the following, and it is still law, Shepardize it if you like. It has been “restricted” and “narrowed” but never the less, it is still good law. The covert end of these rulings has not been reached. The gross failure to follow the simplest of the rules of construction, the severability clause, proves SCOTUS is still seeking absolute dominance over government.

Rector, et al, Holy Trinity Church vs United States
143 US 457 (1892)
“(@ 12 SCT 511) It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is within the letter of (the law) … (@ 12 SCT 512) It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers. This has been often as-serted, and the Reports are full of cases illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator; for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circum-stances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.”

Emphasis added.

It is important to note the historical context of this decision, especially with the court using the illogical reasoning that it expresses above.
In 1892 there was a Federal Labor law that stated that no enterprise could em-ploy a foreigner for any position whatsoever in these United States if there was an American able and willing to do that job.
Holy Trinity Church is the Episcopal Church located at Wall & Church Streets in New York City. It was originally Anglican a.k.a. Church of England (C of E), but, as did most Anglican Churches in 1776, vote to distance itself from The Crown. Holy Trinity Church is where Alexander Hamilton is buried. It is where the power elite of old families of New York City, and the early Federalists, belonged, worshipped, and congregated. It is where the business people attended. Currently, it owns ALL of the land from Wall Street south and collects all of the rents therefrom. As a church, it pays no taxes but supports various politicians and approved charities.
In 1888, Holy Trinity Church decided to employ a new bell ringer. The Elders de-cided to hire a German to do it. They did in fact know that there were hundreds, if not thousands, of New Yorkers ready, willing and able to do the job. They did not care, and they did in fact know that they were breaking the law, at least according to the syllabus.
And, the Supremes decided to keep John Marshall’s usurpation of power alive and well, the Constitution of the United States notwithstanding.

[page taken from The Albany Plan Re-Visited © 2012 William S. Klocek]

IV

Article IV is one of the most egregiously and violently violated articles of the constitution. [§1 Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Act, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved and the Effect thereof. §2 The Citizens of each State be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. … . §3 New States … . §4 The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of government, and shall protect each of them from Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.]

(I must pause and catch my breath every time that I proofread this essay when I get to this point. Ah-ha, not better, should probably go get a scotch & water, no ice.)

Just a little bit here, as once you read the very few points that I make, y’all will be putting forth many more of your own, and realize that secession is the least bloody way of getting rid of this.

For decades, the only two places an American could get a divorce were Mexico and the State of Nevada. For Nevada, you went to Reno, rented a room for six weeks to establish CITIZENSHIP through meeting the residency requirements, then filed for a “no fault” divorce and it was routinely granted. Ta-da! The divorce became good worldwide!!!

First problem, as SSA and Medicaid became rights, the residency requirement limit-ing access to State Aid, was dissolved by SCOTUS, as residency requirements somehow infringed on a magically implied constitutional right to mobility. This issue as a national issue is still unresolved.

Second problem, now that California and New York have decided to grant Illegal Aliens driver’s licenses, these new license holders may now travel legally everywhere within the federal jurisdiction, regardless of the rights and laws of the other 48 states. Note also the invasion all along our Southern border and how the feds are not protecting our citizens.

Third problem, these NY & CA driver’s licenses are Legal Acts within the meaning of Article IV. THEY ARE NOW USABLE AS GOVERNMENT ISSUED LICENSES, WHICH MAY BE USED TO REGISTER TO VOTE IN ALL 50 STATES!!! Think that I’m joking? Look at how the ACLU and La Raza have prevented the use of photo ID’s to register to vote and as proof of citizenship at voting precincts. Magically, to denote citizenship or lack thereof on these licenses will, by federal court ruling, be discrimination, thus, all driver’s licenses MUST be the same, and thus, automatic amnesty and FULL citizenship!

Now, consider this, if any State pass a law that CA or NY licenses are not valid forms of identification, do you really think that the NAACP, La Raza, or the ACLU, will sit idly by? What federal court won’t declare such a law unconstitutional simply on a clear reading of Article IV???

Do I really need to go into the problems with PPACA, abortion laws, right to work laws, DMV laws, tax laws, landlord-tenant laws, &c.? Or do you think that you can pick up your local paper, or listen to your local talk radio, and see the problems with how Article IV has been interpreted and abused? Hasn’t Breitbart reported more than a dozen illegal alien crimes this week alone, including child molestation and vehicular manslaughter?

V

I’m going to pass on the rest of the articles, except to point out that Article V is the amending article, and the post on this blog regarding how The XIVth Amendment has never been ratified pretty much covers all of that, and Article VI §1 is about debts made before the constitution was ratified, but that Article VI §2 is the so often abused and intentionally misinterpreted “supremacy” clause. As pointed out earlier, this clause should be viewed through the two glasses of the preamble and the AFP, and has not been. Article VII is that this constitution shall go into effect as between them when nine of the 13 STATES ratify it.

VI

I should probably go into the amendments, there are 27 of them, but there are only a few of immediate concern. We are constantly talking about The 1st Amendment, which deals with various freedoms including that of religion and assembly. One point, it applies to rules and laws made by The Federal Government and was put in to specifically prevent the feds from doing things like the PPACA forcing people to pay taxes that violate their religious beliefs. Keep in mind that Massachusetts and Pennsylvania had State religions into the 1840’s. Those states collected taxes that paid for the salaries of preachers and their estates, so much for the supremacy clause and freedom of religion.

The 2nd Amendment as intended by The Founders gives non-felons the right to bear arms. A quick look at the time and how The Minute Men were formed, organized, supplied, and supported, proves this without any doubt. However, for those of you who do not believe this, elsewhere is a complete essay on the federal law that defines the militia. Simply put, ALL healthy males, except for a very limited set of exemptions – primarily the “essential” personnel groups of federally elected officials and certain bureaucrats- between the ages of 16 and 48 (the ages may have changed as I haven’t looked since I wrote the original essay), are The Militia. Ya, and some women, too, but you need to read the law to see who. AND, each and every member of this militia is supposed to know basic drill/ The Landing Party Manual, a basic knowledge of infantry tactics, basic marksmanship, and to have and maintain a RIFLE! Yupper, Federal Law states this! Under this federal law, who among you are un-convicted felons?

And, a quick aside as to a peculiar point of history and The 2nd Amendment: After Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Courthouse, the hatred between the races, as pointed out by Shelby Foote’s book, caused by The Emancipation Proclamation, caused the creation of the KKK, which went about keeping the former slaves in check, mostly through violence, particularly murder. The National Rifle Association was created to buy arms, GIVE THEM to former slaves, and train them in their use, so that they may protect themselves from such terrorism.

Last point in here, the 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendments are the ‘criminal rights’ amendments. Originally designed to protect ALL citizens from the over-reach of the federal judiciary and congress, they have been misinterpreted to protect only criminals. Think about it, only criminals are granted Due Process. PPACA is a tax that the taxpayer cannot individually challenge. YOU CANNOT challenge the feds when the IRS takes everything away through a mistake. YOU CANNOT challenge the feds when the DEA breaks into your home when they meant to break in next door. YOU CANNOT challenge the EPA when they declare that all standing water is protected by The Clean Air Act, thus they have authority on your driveway even though that puddle will evaporate. Under The Patriot Act, you cannot challenge a warrantless search. And, the list goes on and on.

Epilogue and Conclusion

There are other things to consider, but with all of the above, where else can you go? National Bankruptcy, Civil War, a perverted Constitutional Convention, Anarchy to Tyranny, or Secession, which one is actually reasonable and workable?

But what benefits derive from secession?

1

The first and most urgent benefit from a Red State Secession is that of immediate and complete control over the National Debt.

The Red States will take 1/3rd of the debt, or a projected $6T, leaving the industry heavy and, if allowed to be, completely energy independent blue states with $12T. No real change is apparent at this point. OH! COME LOOK AND SEE!!! The $83T of UNFUNDED DEBT immediately disappears through operation of Contract Law through rescission and novation!!! Simply put, because the legal entity known as The United States of America dis-appears, except for the total national debt, all contracts and promises made by it also dis-appear. Magic! Harry Potter couldn’t do it better. Don’t believe me? Consider how when someone dies, his estate pays off what debt it can, but once unprotected assets are used up, the rest of the debt is simply written off. Here, the new entities, blue and red, accept their proportionate share of that debt, but, as in death, all of the deceased’s promises are vacated as un-executable.

Thus, there is NO MORE unfunded debt. Magic!

2

Next, as noted many times above, all of the laws and court decisions of The Union are no longer applicable to The Red States. And, because of the secession, The Blue States MUST review ALL of those laws and decisions for current applicability to them! Gosh and Golly, two win-win situations in a row, I wonder if there are any more to be had.

3

The Red States will write a new constitution. One applicable to the Times! One that will include electricity, electronics, medicine, &c. in it. This convention would have over 238 years of U.S. AND WORLD HISTORY to guide it. It could start with The Albany Plan, The Virginia Plan, The New York Plan, The Heartland Plan, and The Rhode Island Plan as well as Hagehot’s British Constitution as initial proposals, and then put together a truly workable federal government that would leave local issue to the locals, and make certain that the new federal government dealt ONLY WITH FEDERAL ISSUES. Hmm, three good reasons in a row.

4

By secession, the economic circumstances of North America would change almost instantly for the better. Yupper, Canada, The Red States, The Blue States, Mexico, Central America, and The Caribbean would instantly become the most dynamic economic machine through the forced renegotiation of all trade agreements. The XL Pipeline would immedi-ately be started, Pass Christian MS, Pascagoula MS, Tampa FL, Vera Cruz MX, Hispaniola, and Cuba, could start building new, environmentally safe, refineries. NAFTA would be re-done to require uniform enforcement. Unemployment should drop to 3% average throughout the entire region while labor force involvement should jump to 69%. Nuclear Fusion plants would be planned and built. A standardized rail system from Point Barrow to Panama City Panama would be built. Stabilization of currency would be immediate.

5+

How much more do you want? Taxation would be rationalized and evened out. Education throughout would be standardized and equalized. Private property and wealth would be protected, which could be done now if only the various governments would im-plement the laws currently on the books.

6+

Borders would be closed and protected. An intelligent and uniform foreign policy would be emplaced.

7+

More? How about true freedom of religion? How about being protected against terrorist attacks, like the Boston Marathon, by terrorists, instead of useless assaults on our persons by an ineffective TSA?
Secession, secession, secession, and secession BEFORE THE NATIONAL DEBT GOES PAST $18t AND THE UNFUNDED $83T

Secession!

July 4, 2014

4th of July, Signers of the Declaration of Independence, by BEvans [nc]

HAPPY FOURTH OF JULY!

Have you ever wondered what happened to the 56 men who signed the Declaration of Independence?

Five signers were captured by the British as traitors and tortured before they died.

Twelve had their homes ransacked and burned. Two lost their sons serving in the Revolutionary Army; another had two sons captured.

Nine of the 56 fought and died from wounds or hardships of the Revolutionary War.

They signed and they pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor.

What kind of men were they?

Twenty-four were lawyers and jurists. Eleven were merchants, nine were farmers and large plantation owners; men of means, well educated, but they signed the Declaration of Independence knowing full well that the penalty would be death if they were captured.

Carter Braxton of Virginia, a wealthy planter and trader, saw his ships swept from the seas by the British Navy. He sold his home and properties to pay his debts, and died in rags.

Thomas McKeam was so hounded by the British that he was forced to move his family almost constantly. He served in the Congress without pay, and his family was kept in hiding. His possessions were taken from him and poverty was his reward.

Vandals or soldiers looted the properties of Dillery, Hall, Clymer, Walton, Gwinnett, Heyward, Ruttledge, and Middleton.

At the battle of Yorktown, Thomas Nelson, Jr. noted that the British General Cornwallis had taken over the Nelson home for his headquarters. He quietly urged General George Washington to open fire. The home was destroyed and Nelson died bankrupt.

Francis Lewis had his home and properties destroyed. The enemy jailed his wife and she died within a few months.

John Hart was driven from his wife’s bedside as she was dying. Their 13 children fled for their lives. His fields and his gristmill were laid to waste. For more than a year he lived in forests and caves, returning home to find his wife dead and his children vanished.

So take a few minutes while enjoying your 4th of July holiday and silently thank these patriots. It’s not much to ask for the price they paid.

It’s time we get the word out that patriotism is NOT a sin and the Fourth of July has much more to it than picnics, baseball games, and fireworks.

April 23, 2014

the other shoe just dropped, by Simon Black, no comment

The Next Shoe Just Dropped: Court Denies Attorney-Client Privilege
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Submitted by Tyler Durden on 04/19/2014 22:14 -0400

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Submitted by Simon Black via Sovereign Man blog,

In the Land of the Free, people grow up hearing a lot of things about their freedom.

You’re told that you live in the freest country on the planet. You’re told that other nations ‘hate you’ for your freedom.

And you’re told that you have the most open and fair justice system in the world.

This justice system is supposedly founded on bedrock principles– things like a defendant being presumed innocent until proven guilty. The right to due process and an impartial hearing. The right to counsel and attorney-client privilege.

Yet each of these core pillars has been systematically dismantled over the years:

1. So that it can operate with impunity outside of the law, the federal government has set up its own secret FISA courts to rubber stamp NSA surveillance.

According to data obtained by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, of the nearly 34,000 surveillance requests made to FISA courts in the last 35-years, only ELEVEN have been rejected.

Unsurprising given that FISA courts only hear the case from the government’s perspective. It is literally a one-sided argument in FISA courts. Hardly an impartial hearing, no?

2. The concept of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ may officially exist in courts, but administratively it was thrown out long ago.

These days there are hundreds of local, state, and federal agencies that can confiscate your assets, levy your bank account, and freeze you out of your life’s savings. None of this requires a court order.

By the time a case goes to court, you have been deprived of the resources you need to defend yourself. You might technically be presumed innocent, but you have been treated and punished like a criminal from day one.

3. Attorney-Client privilege is a long-standing legal concept which ensures that communication between an attorney and his/her client is completely private.

In Upjohn vs. the United States, the Supreme Court itself upheld attorney-client privilege as necessary “to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law. . .”

It doesn’t matter what you’re accused of– theft. treason. triple homicide. With very limited exceptions, an attorney cannot be compelled to testify against a client, nor can their communications be subpoenaed for evidence.

Yet in a United States Tax Court decision announced on Wednesday, the court dismissed attorney client privilege, stating that:

“When a person puts into issue his subjective intent in deciding how to comply with the law, he may forfeit the privilege afforded attorney-client communications.”

In other words, if a person works with legal counsel within the confines of the tax code to legitimately minimize the amount of taxes owed, that communication is no longer protected by attorney-client privilege.

Furthermore, the ruling states that if the individuals do not submit attorney-client documentation as required, then the court would prohibit them from introducing any evidence to demonstrate their innocence.

Unbelievable.

While it’s true that attorney-client privilege has long been assailed in numerous court cases (especially with regards to tax matters), this decision sets the most dangerous precedent yet.

With this ruling, government now has carte blanche to set aside long-standing legal protections and even deny a human being even the chance to defend himself.

Naturally, you won’t hear a word about this in the mainstream media.

But it certainly begs the question, what’s the point of even having a trial? Or a constitution?

When every right and protection you have can be disregarded in their sole discretion, one really has to wonder how anyone can call it a ‘free country’ any more.

April 18, 2014

S.Ct. Justice Stevens & the 2nd Amendment, from ABA Journal my notes[]

Justice Stevens & the 2nd Amendment, from the ABA Journal, my notes in []

Posted: 18 April 2014

[Another reason for secession. This article is from this week’s, 18 April 2014, ABA Journal.

Notice Justice Stevens wants the legislature to change the 2nd Amendment. Note how the liberal justices ALWAYS ignore Article V. Article V is the article which explains how amendments are to be made. Stevens, and the others, all want amendments to go through the legislature. A legislature controlled by the likes of Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid. Keep in mind that Pelosi’s net worth before she became a “public servant”, was a negative value – she owed more than she was worth. Since becoming a “public servant”, her net worth is over $25,000,000.00. Yupper, that’s 25 million U.S. Dollars. As to Reid, go to the Youtube address posted as the first line after [ ] in the Bundy Farm Fact Check post, posted yesterday.

As noted in “The Albany Plan Re-Visited”, Justice Stevens has not got a clue as to who the militia is. Federal Statute defines the militia of the United States. Last time that I looked, that was every able bodied male between the ages of 16 and 54, the only exceptions being first responders and, get this, elected officials. Women were excluded. Now, it has been many years since I looked, but I doubt that the definition has changed extensively, if at all.

Secession, pure and simple, secession.]





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Constitutional Law
Retired Justice Stevens proposes this fix for the Second Amendment
Posted Apr 14, 2014 6:25 AM CDT
By Debra Cassens Weiss
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Retired U.S. Supreme Court
Justice John Paul Stevens.
Rena Schild / Shutterstock.com
Legislators rather than federal judges should be allowed to decide what kind of guns can be carried by private citizens, as well as when and how those weapons can be used, according to retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens.
Toward that end, Stevens is proposing a change to the Second Amendment to clarify that it applies only to citizens’ right to keep and bear arms in state militias. He offers his suggestion in a Washington Post essay taken from his new book, Six Amendments: How and Why We Should Change the Constitution.
Stevens thinks the court misinterpreted the amendment in recent opinions finding a right to own a handgun at home for self-defense. The amendment reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
Stevens would add five words to the amendment, so that it reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms when serving in the Militia shall not be infringed.”

February 11, 2014

The Health Care Hoax

The Health Care Hoax
Posted: 12 February 2014

Let’s put national health care in its historical perspective, and then consider the truth of the matter.

For our purposes, we will ignore the rest of the world, not bring too far forward how the NHS in the UK dictates their internal politics and is ration driven, nor how in Canada they flood to the US for care, nor how they invade the US from Mexico to get social services of all kinds.

We will start in 1950.

As noted elsewhere, everything is connected, just not in the ‘butterfly effect’ that a small number of physicists and mathematicians think.

Prior to 1950, health care was the responsibility of the individual. The medical profession was regulated in the same manner as other special service businesses, most notably lawyers, accountants, and bankers. Doctors, lawyers, and barbers had to take proficiency exams before they could charge for their services and were held accountable for their actions, not only through Tort Law, but through internal policing, and self-defense by buying liability insurance. They attended specialized schools, with specialized educations and fields of study. Funding of health care was primarily in the form of direct payment for services, with a small, expanding, insurance segment.

In the 1950’s, the failure of The Federal Government to overhaul the income tax code, led to unions negotiating for benefits, rather than wages. This change in direction was a direct result of FDR’s Transnational Policies. Government had decided that income would be taxed in the unfair step-rate method. Those whose incomes where under $10,000 would not be taxed. Union wages, and thus first line supervisors and then up the entire corporate chain of command got compensation increases. Through negotiation, post WW II labor shortages, and an aggressively growing US economy, people found their wages entering the taxable income levels. In order to reduce the impact on blue collar and first level white collar workers, benefits were, as a matter of law, decided to not be income , and thus, non-taxable. Before the expansion of health care as a benefit of employment, and therefore, the insurance industry, the individual had to pay for medical services either out of pocket, or by paying for his own insurance, again, out of pocket.

The consumer of health care knew AND FELT, the direct costs of medical care. (For purposes of clarity, simplicity, and understanding, we’ll gloss over technological –pharmaceutical advances in the field, which, in and of themselves, are a significant factor in driving up costs.)

The individual needed cash in hand to visit the doctor.

The individual needed cash in hand to have the doctor make a house call.

The individual often looked to alternative, less expensive, care options. One got a mid-wife to deliver ones’ child. One had the child born at home, not in a specialized and expensive ‘birthing facility’.

The individual knew what he was paying for when he got it, and got what he was paying for and, in many instances, was getting more than he was paying for, the medical profession being very altruistic and actually believing in the Hippocratic Oath.

Almost all peaking of health care expenses have been caused by the interference of the Federal Government.

As noted, with Federal Labor Laws and the Internal Revenue Code impacting employment compensation, health care became an area of national interest. While employers and employees were working out a viable adaptation of this into their business models , left wing idealists were actually looking to create a capitalistic style economic safety net. Enter Camelot Jack and LBJ.

Jack was controlled by a GOP congress. Even so, he got us started in Viet Nam, failed us with Cuba, killed “The Monroe Doctrine” , but was persuaded to leave the domestic economy alone. Benefits packages became traditional in a very short time, and expected to expand as a method of tax avoidance.

LBJ, wanting to be more left than Camelot, with a Democratic Party controlled congress, got Medicare passed. Medicare is the first, direct, and most damaging of government intervention in health care spiking costs to levels that we will never be able to go back to.

Medicare provided our second, federally enforced, Ponzi scheme. Medicare, through the HCFA payroll tax, takes money from employees and employers, to pay for, AT NON-MARKET, BUREAUCRATICALLY DISCOUNTED FIXED RATES, health care for those over 65. There is NO negotiation for these rates, and facilities must meet government fixed standards. The actual cost of Medicare services has not, in Medicare’s history, ever met the actual cost of the services provided. Health care providers, and insurance companies, have simply allowed those unpaid costs to be integrated into insurance premiums.

This is the first, huge and unrealistic spike in health care costs; not caused by technological –pharmaceutical advances; NOT caused by an increase in wages to doctors and nurses; & NOT caused by a surge in facilities’ expenses.

A decade later comes the next huge spike, again caused by federal intervention.

HIPAA.

Except in few jurisdictions, those applying for a marriage license must get blood tests. These tests are not for DNA incompatibility, they are a check for venereal diseases being harbored in the applicant’s body. These tests are carried out by state law, under state constitutions, authorized by each state’s right to protect the health and welfare of its citizens. This is NOT a federal issue, however ….

With the expansion of “civil rights” well beyond that intended by the founders , or even by most US citizens, sexual preferences have been designated as constitutionally protected civil rights. In order to protect the reputations of people with HIV/Aids, HIPAA created a situation that so altered the medical care delivery system, that this political agenda and group preferential treatment, again unrelated to actual medical services, had caused billions of dollars to be spent to reconfigure the physical facilities of the system.

Prior to HIPAA, wards and semi-private rooms existed in hospitals, emergency rooms, and clinics. Wards, where groups of people could be treated using economy of scale to keep down costs, disappeared. Where one ward could treat 20 people, with a small group lavatory, where one main line could feed oxygen or other gases to patients, where one physician making rounds could visit 9 patients in an hour as opposed to 2, where nurses could be physically on hand for all circumstances .

Here are only some of the physical costs. A complete lavatory per room instead of a group lavatory, LIKE THE ONE THAT YOU HAVE AT WORK OR AT A RESTAURANT! Expanded physical space, the hospital building needing to expand the walls, ceilings, floors, electrical wiring, plumbing, elevators, &c, at what cost? Buying land to build on. Telephones, corridors, laundries, visitation space, &c. absolutely none of these things enhancing the delivery of services, but now required by federal law!

The Emergency Room Access Act, another federal law, requiring that, regardless of condition, legal right, criminal status, or ability to pay, everyone, in any and all conditions, who presents at an emergency room, must be treated and may not be released until the presenting condition has been “stabilized”. This, as argued prior to the enactment of this legislation, simply made Emergency Rooms, the clinic of choice for the uninsured, the illegal, and the criminal. This created an economic crisis in the delivery of emergency care.

And now, The Affordable Care Act, which, according to all realistic estimates and CBO reports, will increase costs across the board, while at the same time, significantly lowering standards of care and rationing care in the same fashion as in Europe!

Consider: before The Affordable Care Act, everyone physically in the US, had free access to premium, personal health care, REGARDLESS OF ABILITY TO PAY!!!

Consider: before The Affordable Care Act, over 40% of all hospital beds, were being provided by charitable institutions, e.g., The Sisters of Carondelet (Roman Catholic), Long Island Jewish Hospital (B’Nai B’Rith), Shawnee Mission Medical Center (Seventh Day Adventists), St. Luke’s Health System (Episcopalian), &c., whose whole purpose is charitable giving, charity health care, and at no cost to taxpayers.

St. Jude’s doesn’t charge; Children’s Mercy Kansas City doesn’t charge; Cornell Medical Center doesn’t charge; KU Med doesn’t charge, &c. They are pleased to take insurance payments if the patient has insurance, but admission is not based on ability to pay.

Need I go into the constitutionality of it? It isn’t!

Footnotes:
I could easily go into how FDR created the extended US economic depression through his keeping the US Dollar pegged to gold when economists were telling him not to and his Euro-Centric monetary policy, and other anti-US policies of his, but there’s a whole section in “The Albany Plan Re-Visited” about this.
Tangentially, this has led to the pension problem, most particularly how it has killed the US auto industry through the inability to fund UAW pensions, and the bankruptcy of Detroit, and soon of Illinois and California.
Another point not needed here: Tort Reform and the needed additional education, and its inherent expense, that doctors need to understand and use the advancing technologies.
Ok, it’s the 50’s. This model predated globalization and the fierce competition in labor costs currently impacting us. For the moment, we are only dealing with a portion of the entire problem of utopian government failure.
Yah, another area we’ll gloss over. Just suffice it to say that in exchange for the USSR removing inoperable missiles from Cuba, Camelot Jack promised that the US would no longer take any military action against anything going on in the Western Hemisphere, and guaranteed the territorial integrity of Cuba.
Avoidance, not evasion: Avoidance is every citizen’s duty, evasion is a felony.
I have litigated extensively in this area; I know whereof I speak in detail.
And, one must consider that 90% of ones’ total medical costs come in the last one year of ones’ life. Pause for effect: yupper, this means that by unconstitutional government fiat, 90% of almost all medical costs of ones’ life had just been shifted from the individual, to the taxpayer! AND, worse yet, these are at an unrealistic discount!
Two direct points here: a quick survey of the writings of the founders shows both health care and sexual preferences to be areas of life from which the federal government was specifically excluded; and two, the founders included Article V, again in both “The Federalist Papers” and in “The Anti-Federalist Papers”, as a method of allowing THE TAX PAYING CITIZENS, to amend The Constitution, to specifically deal with such issues. As an aside, they did consider giving this power to The Supreme Court, and rejected it. Something that CJ Marshall decided on his own to change.
Compare that to the current facility where a nurses’ station is located yards down the hall from the patient’s room. If the nurse is busy in room 3 and the patient in room 1 pushes her emergency button, which lights up the previously un-needed red bulb over the patient’s exterior door, how is she to know that the patient in room 1 is in need? What if this need is a critical need? The heart monitor beeping flat line, but the nurse so out of position that she will never know until the patient in room 1 has passed.
While running for president in 2008, Hillary Clinton stated in an interview that the cost of the uninsured to the insured was $800 per premium/ individual covered by private insurance. Compare that to the CBO $2,500 – $7,500 estimate of premium increase under “The Affordable Care Act”.
A known to me true example is that of the Multiple Sclerosis sufferer, unfortunately no celebrity like Michael J. Fox has chosen this disease to become the spox for, but, Avonex, Beta-Seron, and Ampyra, are now on the questionable list for Rx. The first two are anti-cancer drugs, the last a muscle treatment which allows a sufferer to actually lift one’s legs and walk without falling, stumbling, or collapsing.
Although the unconstitutionality of it is posted elsewhere on this blog, y’all must consider the very simple fact that The Federal Government, under this constitution, does not have the authority to force someone to buy something, nor to force an employer to pay for something, that they do not want. (I have pointed out elsewhere how CJ Robert’s ruling is corrupt and unconstitutional on its face, posted elsewhere on this blog.)

[Addenda: received the following email, its self-explanatory, on 27 March 14 :

I Think SHE IS PISSED!

I don’t think ‘pissed’ really covers it!!!!

Alan Simpson, the Senator from Wyoming , calls senior citizens the ‘Greediest Generation’ as he compared “Social Security” to a Milk Cow with 310 million teats.

Here’s a response in a letter from PATTY MYERS in Montana … I think she is a little ticked off! She also tells it like it is!

………………………………………………………………………………

“Hey, Alan, let’s get a few things straight!!!!!

1. As a career politician,

you have been on the public dole (tit) for FIFTY YEARS.

2. I have been paying Social Security taxes for 48 YEARS (since I was 15 years old. I am now 63).

3. My Social Security payments, and those of millions of other Americans, were safely tucked away in ‘an interest bearing account’ for decades until you political pukes decided to raid the account and give OUR money to a bunch of losers in return for votes , thus bankrupting the system and turning Social Security into a Ponzi scheme that would make Bernie Madoff proud.

4. Recently, just like Lucy and Charlie Brown, you and “your ilk” pulled the proverbial football away from millions of American seniors nearing retirement and moved the goalposts for full retirement from age 65 to age, 67. NOW, you and your “shill commission” are proposing to move the goalposts YET AGAIN .

5. I, and millions of other Americans, have been paying into Medicare from day one, and now

“you” propose to change the rules of the game. Why? Because “you” mismanaged other parts of the economy to such an extent that you need to steal our money from Medicare to pay the bills.

6. I, and millions of other Americans, have been paying income taxes our entire lives, and now you propose to increase our taxes yet again. Why? Because you “incompetents” spent our money so profligately that you just kept on spending even after you ran out of money. Now, you come to the American taxpayers and say you need more to pay off YOUR debt.

7.To add insult to injury, you label us “greedy” for calling “bullshit” to your incompetence . Well, Captain Bullshit , I have a few questions for YOU:

1. How much money have you earned from the American taxpayers during your pathetic 50-year political career?

2. At what age did you retire from your pathetic political career, and how much are you receiving in annual retirement benefits from the American taxpayers?

3. How much do you pay for YOUR government provided health insurance?

4. What cuts in YOUR retirement and healthcare benefits are you proposing in your disgusting deficit reduction proposal, or as usual, have you exempted yourself and your political cronies?

It is you, Captain Bullshit , and your political co-conspirators called Congress who are the

“greedy” ones. It is you and your fellow thieves who have bankrupted America and stolen the American dream from millions of loyal, patriotic taxpayers. And for what? Votes, your job and retirement security at our expense, you leech.

That’s right, sir. You and yours have bankrupted America for the sole purpose of advancing

your political careers. You know it, we know it, and you know that we know it.

And you can take that to the bank you miserable son of a bitch .

NO, I did not stutter.

P.S. And stop calling Social Security benefits “entitlements”. WHAT AN INSULT!!!!

I have been paying in to the SS system for 45 years. It’s my money-give it back to me the way the system was designed and stop patting yourself on the back like you are being generous by doling out these monthly checks.

EVERYONE!!!

If you like the way things are in America delete this.

If you agree with what a Montana citizen, Patty Myers, says, please PASS IT ON]

August 18, 2013

Mark Levin is part of the problem

Filed under: Political Commentary — Tags: , , , , , , , , — justplainbill @ 7:08 pm

Mark Levin is part of the problem

 

I caught the open audience broadcast of Sean Hannity (Friday, 16 Aug 13 FOXNews) and found myself in the unhappy position of talking back to the TV. First things first, back in 2007, a little recognized, strongly vilified book, The Heartland Plan, was published. Succinctly, it says most of what Levin says in The Liberty Amendments, but covers more and offers more, and in my personal opinion, a much better solution than Levin, Hannity, and other non-hackers (a non-hacker is someone who has never served in the military, it is not a pejorative, simply a blue-collar expression denoting that a set of important and unique personal experiences is lacking in an individual). Their source materials are the same, only the conclusions are different.

 

One of many points missed by Levin & Friends, is that the founders limited the voting franchise to those males who paid taxes, which included free blacks, thus, only about 10% of the population voted. The Heartland Plan predicted Obama-Soetoro and the completion of Roosevelt-Wilson’s post-constitutional America. For those interested, The Just Plain Bill podcast show, archives available at www.blogtalkradio.com/justplainbillshow, used much of the material in The Heartland Plan during its limited lifetime. One of its May 2009 shows is worth listening to several times as it clearly and concisely explains business and business’s place in the economy.

 

In 2013, a follow-up to The Heartland Plan was published. The Albany Plan Re-Visited, available at www.bn.com/ebooks, it projects the devastating effects of the Obama Administration, and offers a viable solution to many of the current problems. One of them is, again Levin & Friends ignore it, that there is no difference between the Democrats and Republicans. The Tea Party does not have a philosophical core as evidenced by their lack of a written charter, and absence of a manifesto. The Albany Plan Re-Visited, includes instructions for a viable third party, Whigs, a reincarnation of the moderate party of the 1840’s & 1850’s, which would actually represent those who pay federal taxes, the states being completely separate, legal entities.

 

The Albany Plan Re-Visited, also explains government on the 10th grade level, not the 4th grade level, so, if you are unaccustomed to reading, you’ll need a dictionary.

 

People like Levin & Friends, would have us go back to 1787 and ignore the advances that we’ve made in sociology, psychology, and political philosophy. The 1787 constitution was being destroyed as early as 1798 with the Supreme Court rulings on The Alien and Sedition Acts. Marshall, with his line of decisions starting with Marbury vs Madison, continued the destruction until Lincoln absolutely destroyed the 1787 constitution with his illegal invasion of a free and independent nation.

 

It’s time to move forward, not backward. Buy, read, and promote, The Albany Plan Re-Visited.

September 28, 2009

Roe v Wade, Not really about abortion, is it?

For those of you who have actually begun to wonder if Roe says what the media says that it says, here it is. Roe is actually about ‘standing’ and ‘mootness’. It’s wrong on its face, but so many of the Supremes’ decisions are, who can count and what can we do (vote Whig, of course, but that’d require that you buy the book: “Three Strikes and You’re out”, which you can’t find, can you?), about it? Three Strikes also has a section that includes the legal proof that the Federal Government cannot legally tax personal income. So, here’s Roe v Wade in its entirety:

BLACKMUN, J., Opinion of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

——————————————————————————–

410 U.S. 113

Roe v. Wade
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

——————————————————————————–

No. 70-18 Argued: December 13, 1971 — Decided: January 22, 1973

——————————————————————————–

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, present constitutional challenges to state criminal abortion legislation. The Texas statutes under attack here are typical of those that have been in effect in many States for approximately a century. The Georgia statutes, in contrast, have a modern cast, and are a legislative product that, to an extent at least, obviously reflects the influences of recent attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and techniques, and of new thinking about an old issue.

We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one’s religious training, one’s attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one’s thinking and conclusions about abortion.

In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem.

Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this, and, because we do, we [p117] have inquired into, and in this opinion place some emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that history reveals about man’s attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the centuries. We bear in mind, too, Mr. Justice Holmes’ admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905):

[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.

I

The Texas statutes that concern us here are Arts. 1191-1194 and 1196 of the State’s Penal Code. [n1] These make it a crime to “procure an abortion,” as therein [p118] defined, or to attempt one, except with respect to “an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.” Similar statutes are in existence in a majority of the States. [n2] [p119]

Texas first enacted a criminal abortion statute in 1854. Texas Laws 1854, c. 49, § 1, set forth in 3 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 1502 (1898). This was soon modified into language that has remained substantially unchanged to the present time. See Texas Penal Code of 1857, c. 7, Arts. 531-536; G. Paschal, Laws of Texas, Arts. 2192-2197 (1866); Texas Rev.Stat., c. 8, Arts. 536-541 (1879); Texas Rev.Crim.Stat., Arts. 1071-1076 (1911). The final article in each of these compilations provided the same exception, as does the present Article 1196, for an abortion by “medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.” [n3] [p120]

II

Jane Roe, [n4] a single woman who was residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted this federal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes.

Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion “performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions”; that she was unable to get a “legal” abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. By an amendment to her complaint, Roe purported to sue “on behalf of herself and all other women” similarly situated.

James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe’s action. In his complaint, he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes, and [p121] that two such prosecutions were pending against him. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions, and he claimed that for many cases he, as a physician, was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196. He alleged that, as a consequence, the statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own and his patients’ rights to privacy in the doctor-patient relationship and his own right to practice medicine, rights he claimed were guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

John and Mary Doe, [n5] a married couple, filed a companion complaint to that of Roe. They also named the District Attorney as defendant, claimed like constitutional deprivations, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple; that Mrs. Doe was suffering from a “neural-chemical” disorder; that her physician had “advised her to avoid pregnancy until such time as her condition has materially improved” (although a pregnancy at the present time would not present “a serious risk” to her life); that, pursuant to medical advice, she had discontinued use of birth control pills; and that, if she should become pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician under safe, clinical conditions. By an amendment to their complaint, the Does purported to sue “on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly situated.”

The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court. The suits thus presented the situations of the pregnant single woman, the childless couple, with the wife not pregnant, [p122] and the licensed practicing physician, all joining in the attack on the Texas criminal abortion statutes. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class, and Dr. Hallford, had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies, but that the Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy, and did not have standing. It concluded that, with respect to the requests for a declaratory judgment, abstention was not warranted. On the merits, the District Court held that the

fundamental right of single women and married persons to choose whether to have children is protected by the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment,

and that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face because they were both unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad infringement of the plaintiffs’ Ninth Amendment rights. The court then held that abstention was warranted with respect to the requests for an injunction. It therefore dismissed the Does’ complaint, declared the abortion statutes void, and dismissed the application for injunctive relief. 314 F.Supp. 1217, 1225 (ND Tex.1970).

The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 have appealed to this Court from that part of the District Court’s judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney has purported to cross-appeal, pursuant to the same statute, from the court’s grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford. Both sides also have taken protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision here. We postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 402 U.S. 941 (1971) [p123]

It might have been preferable if the defendant, pursuant to our Rule 20, had presented to us a petition for certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals with respect to the granting of the plaintiffs’ prayer for declaratory relief. Our decisions in Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970), and Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U.S. 383 (1970), are to the effect that § 1253 does not authorize an appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone. We conclude, nevertheless, that those decisions do not foreclose our review of both the injunctive and the declaratory aspects of a case of this kind when it is properly here, as this one is, on appeal under 1253 from specific denial of injunctive relief, and the arguments as to both aspects are necessarily identical. See Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 80-81 (1960). It would be destructive of time and energy for all concerned were we to rule otherwise. Cf. Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179.

IV

We are next confronted with issues of justiciability, standing, and abstention. Have Roe and the Does established that “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), that insures that

the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution,

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968), and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972)? And what effect did the pendency of criminal abortion charges against Dr. Hallford in state court have upon the propriety of the federal court’s granting relief to him as a plaintiff-intervenor? [p124]

A. Jane Roe. Despite the use of the pseudonym, no suggestion is made that Roe is a fictitious person. For purposes of her case, we accept as true, and as established, her existence; her pregnant state, as of the inception of her suit in March 1970 and as late as May 21 of that year when she filed an alias affidavit with the District Court; and her inability to obtain a legal abortion in Texas.

Viewing Roe’s case as of the time of its filing and thereafter until as late a May, there can be little dispute that it then presented a case or controversy and that, wholly apart from the class aspects, she, as a pregnant single woman thwarted by the Texas criminal abortion laws, had standing to challenge those statutes. Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1125 (CA2 1971); Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833, 838-839 (CA6 1971); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F.Supp. 986, 990-991 (Kan.1972). See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). Indeed, we do not read the appellee’s brief as really asserting anything to the contrary. The “logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated,” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 102, and the necessary degree of contentiousness, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), are both present.

The appellee notes, however, that the record does not disclose that Roe was pregnant at the time of the District Court hearing on May 22, 1970, [n6] or on the following June 17 when the court’s opinion and judgment were filed. And he suggests that Roe’s case must now be moot because she and all other members of her class are no longer subject to any 1970 pregnancy. [p125]

The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950); Golden v. Zwickler, supra; SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).

But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied. Our law should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and in the general population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-179 (1968); United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-633 (1953).

We, therefore, agree with the District Court that Jane Roe had standing to undertake this litigation, that she presented a justiciable controversy, and that the termination of her 1970 pregnancy has not rendered her case moot.

B. Dr. Hallford. The doctor’s position is different. He entered Roe’s litigation as a plaintiff-intervenor, alleging in his complaint that he:

[I]n the past has been arrested for violating the Texas Abortion Laws and at the present time stands charged by indictment with violating said laws in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County, Texas to-wit: (1) The State of Texas vs. [p126] James H. Hallford, No. C-69-5307-IH, and (2) The State of Texas vs. James H. Hallford, No. C-692524-H. In both cases, the defendant is charged with abortion. . . .

In his application for leave to intervene, the doctor made like representations as to the abortion charges pending in the state court. These representations were also repeated in the affidavit he executed and filed in support of his motion for summary judgment.

Dr. Hallford is, therefore, in the position of seeking, in a federal court, declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the same statutes under which he stands charged in criminal prosecutions simultaneously pending in state court. Although he stated that he has been arrested in the past for violating the State’s abortion laws, he makes no allegation of any substantial and immediate threat to any federally protected right that cannot be asserted in his defense against the state prosecutions. Neither is there any allegation of harassment or bad faith prosecution. In order to escape the rule articulated in the cases cited in the next paragraph of this opinion that, absent harassment and bad faith, a defendant in a pending state criminal case cannot affirmatively challenge in federal court the statutes under which the State is prosecuting him, Dr. Hallford seeks to distinguish his status as a present state defendant from his status as a “potential future defendant,” and to assert only the latter for standing purposes here.

We see no merit in that distinction. Our decision in Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), compels the conclusion that the District Court erred when it granted declaratory relief to Dr. Hallford instead of refraining from so doing. The court, of course, was correct in refusing to grant injunctive relief to the doctor. The reasons supportive of that action, however, are those expressed in Samuels v. Mackell, supra, and in Younger v. [p127] Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); and Byrne v. Karaleis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). We note, in passing, that Younger and its companion cases were decided after the three-judge District Court decision in this case.

Dr. Hallford’s complaint in intervention, therefore, is to be dismissed. [n7] He is remitted to his defenses in the state criminal proceedings against him. We reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar as it granted Dr. Hallford relief and failed to dismiss his complaint in intervention.

C. The Does. In view of our ruling as to Roe’s standing in her case, the issue of the Does’ standing in their case has little significance. The claims they assert are essentially the same as those of Roe, and they attack the same statutes. Nevertheless, we briefly note the Does’ posture.

Their pleadings present them as a childless married couple, the woman not being pregnant, who have no desire to have children at this time because of their having received medical advice that Mrs. Doe should avoid pregnancy, and for “other highly personal reasons.” But they “fear . . . they may face the prospect of becoming [p128] parents.” And if pregnancy ensues, they “would want to terminate” it by an abortion. They assert an inability to obtain an abortion legally in Texas and, consequently, the prospect of obtaining an illegal abortion there or of going outside Texas to some place where the procedure could be obtained legally and competently.

We thus have as plaintiffs a married couple who have, as their asserted immediate and present injury, only an alleged “detrimental effect upon [their] marital happiness” because they are forced to “the choice of refraining from normal sexual relations or of endangering Mary Doe’s health through a possible pregnancy.” Their claim is that, sometime in the future, Mrs. Doe might become pregnant because of possible failure of contraceptive measures, and, at that time in the future, she might want an abortion that might then be illegal under the Texas statutes.

This very phrasing of the Does’ position reveals its speculative character. Their alleged injury rests on possible future contraceptive failure, possible future pregnancy, possible future unpreparedness for parenthood, and possible future impairment of health. Any one or more of these several possibilities may not take place, and all may not combine. In the Does’ estimation, these possibilities might have some real or imagined impact upon their marital happiness. But we are not prepared to say that the bare allegation of so indirect an injury is sufficient to present an actual case or controversy. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 41-42; Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. at 109-110; Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d at 1124-1125; Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d at 839. The Does’ claim falls far short of those resolved otherwise in the cases that the Does urge upon us, namely, Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); [p129] and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). See also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).

The Does therefore are not appropriate plaintiffs in this litigation. Their complaint was properly dismissed by the District Court, and we affirm that dismissal.

V

The principal thrust of appellant’s attack on the Texas statutes is that they improperly invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her pregnancy. Appellant would discover this right in the concept of personal “liberty” embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); id. at 460 (WHITE, J., concurring in result); or among those rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Before addressing this claim, we feel it desirable briefly to survey, in several aspects, the history of abortion, for such insight as that history may afford us, and then to examine the state purposes and interests behind the criminal abortion laws.

VI

It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively recent vintage. Those laws, generally proscribing abortion or its attempt at any time during pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the pregnant woman’s life, are not of ancient or even of common law origin. Instead, they derive from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th century. [p130]

1. Ancient attitudes. These are not capable of precise determination. We are told that, at the time of the Persian Empire, abortifacients were known, and that criminal abortions were severely punished. [n8] We are also told, however, that abortion was practiced in Greek times as well as in the Roman Era, [n9] and that “it was resorted to without scruple.” [n10] The Ephesian, Soranos, often described as the greatest of the ancient gynecologists, appears to have been generally opposed to Rome’s prevailing free-abortion practices. He found it necessary to think first of the life of the mother, and he resorted to abortion when, upon this standard, he felt the procedure advisable. [n11] Greek and Roman law afforded little protection to the unborn. If abortion was prosecuted in some places, it seems to have been based on a concept of a violation of the father’s right to his offspring. Ancient religion did not bar abortion. [n12]

2. The Hippocratic Oath. What then of the famous Oath that has stood so long as the ethical guide of the medical profession and that bears the name of the great Greek (460(?)-377(?) B. C.), who has been described [p131] as the Father of Medicine, the “wisest and the greatest practitioner of his art,” and the “most important and most complete medical personality of antiquity,” who dominated the medical schools of his time, and who typified the sum of the medical knowledge of the past? [n13] The Oath varies somewhat according to the particular translation, but in any translation the content is clear:

I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner, I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion, [n14]

or

I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy. [n15]

Although the Oath is not mentioned in any of the principal briefs in this case or in Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, it represents the apex of the development of strict ethical concepts in medicine, and its influence endures to this day. Why did not the authority of Hippocrates dissuade abortion practice in his time and that of Rome? The late Dr. Edelstein provides us with a theory: [n16] The Oath was not uncontested even in Hippocrates’ day; only the Pythagorean school of philosophers frowned upon the related act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers, on the other hand, commended abortion, at least prior to viability. See Plato, Republic, V, 461; Aristotle, Politics, VII, 1335b 25. For the Pythagoreans, however, it was a matter of dogma. For them, the embryo was animate from the moment of conception, and abortion meant destruction of a living being. The abortion clause of the Oath, therefore, “echoes Pythagorean doctrines,” [p132] and “[i]n no other stratum of Greek opinion were such views held or proposed in the same spirit of uncompromising austerity.” [n17]

Dr. Edelstein then concludes that the Oath originated in a group representing only a small segment of Greek opinion, and that it certainly was not accepted by all ancient physicians. He points out that medical writings down to Galen (A.D. 130-200) “give evidence of the violation of almost every one of its injunctions.” [n18] But with the end of antiquity, a decided change took place. Resistance against suicide and against abortion became common. The Oath came to be popular. The emerging teachings of Christianity were in agreement with the Pythagorean ethic. The Oath “became the nucleus of all medical ethics,” and “was applauded as the embodiment of truth.” Thus, suggests Dr. Edelstein, it is “a Pythagorean manifesto, and not the expression of an absolute standard of medical conduct.” [n19]

This, it seems to us, is a satisfactory and acceptable explanation of the Hippocratic Oath’s apparent rigidity. It enables us to understand, in historical context, a long-accepted and revered statement of medical ethics.

3. The common law. It is undisputed that, at common law, abortion performed before “quickening” — the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy [n20] — was not an indictable offense. [n21] The absence [p133] of a common law crime for pre-quickening abortion appears to have developed from a confluence of earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and canon law concepts of when life begins. These disciplines variously approached the question in terms of the point at which the embryo or fetus became “formed” or recognizably human, or in terms of when a “person” came into being, that is, infused with a “soul” or “animated.” A loose consensus evolved in early English law that these events occurred at some point between conception and live birth. [n22] This was “mediate animation.” Although [p134] Christian theology and the canon law came to fix the point of animation at 40 days for a male and 80 days for a female, a view that persisted until the 19th century, there was otherwise little agreement about the precise time of formation or animation. There was agreement, however, that, prior to this point, the fetus was to be regarded as part of the mother, and its destruction, therefore, was not homicide. Due to continued uncertainty about the precise time when animation occurred, to the lack of any empirical basis for the 40-80-day view, and perhaps to Aquinas’ definition of movement as one of the two first principles of life, Bracton focused upon quickening as the critical point. The significance of quickening was echoed by later common law scholars, and found its way into the received common law in this country.

Whether abortion of a quick fetus was a felony at common law, or even a lesser crime, is still disputed. Bracton, writing early in the 13th century, thought it homicide. [n23] But the later and predominant view, following the great common law scholars, has been that it was, at most, a lesser offense. In a frequently cited [p135] passage, Coke took the position that abortion of a woman “quick with childe” is “a great misprision, and no murder.” [n24] Blackstone followed, saying that, while abortion after quickening had once been considered manslaughter (though not murder), “modern law” took a less severe view. [n25] A recent review of the common law precedents argues, however, that those precedents contradict Coke, and that even post-quickening abortion was never established as a common law crime. [n26] This is of some importance, because, while most American courts ruled, in holding or dictum, that abortion of an unquickened fetus was not criminal under their received common law, [n27] others followed Coke in stating that abortion [p136] of a quick fetus was a “misprision,” a term they translated to mean “misdemeanor.” [n28] That their reliance on Coke on this aspect of the law was uncritical and, apparently in all the reported cases, dictum (due probably to the paucity of common law prosecutions for post-quickening abortion), makes it now appear doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a common law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus.

4. The English statutory law. England’s first criminal abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough’s Act, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick fetus, § 1, a capital crime, but, in § 2, it provided lesser penalties for the felony of abortion before quickening, and thus preserved the “quickening” distinction. This contrast was continued in the general revision of 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 13. It disappeared, however, together with the death penalty, in 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 85. § 6, and did not reappear in the Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, § 59, that formed the core of English anti-abortion law until the liberalizing reforms of 1967. In 1929, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34, came into being. Its emphasis was upon the destruction of “the life of a child capable of being born alive.” It made a willful act performed with the necessary intent a felony. It contained a proviso that one was not to be [p137] found guilty of the offense

unless it is proved that the act which caused the death of the child was not done in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother.

A seemingly notable development in the English law was the case of Rex v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687. This case apparently answered in the affirmative the question whether an abortion necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman was excepted from the criminal penalties of the 1861 Act. In his instructions to the jury, Judge Macnaghten referred to the 1929 Act, and observed that that Act related to “the case where a child is killed by a willful act at the time when it is being delivered in the ordinary course of nature.” Id. at 691. He concluded that the 1861 Act’s use of the word “unlawfully,” imported the same meaning expressed by the specific proviso in the 1929 Act, even though there was no mention of preserving the mother’s life in the 1861 Act. He then construed the phrase “preserving the life of the mother” broadly, that is, “in a reasonable sense,” to include a serious and permanent threat to the mother’s health, and instructed the jury to acquit Dr. Bourne if it found he had acted in a good faith belief that the abortion was necessary for this purpose. Id. at 693-694. The jury did acquit.

Recently, Parliament enacted a new abortion law. This is the Abortion Act of 1967, 15 & 16 Eliz. 2, c. 87. The Act permits a licensed physician to perform an abortion where two other licensed physicians agree (a)

that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated,

or (b)

that there is a substantial risk that, if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as [p138] to be seriously handicapped.

The Act also provides that, in making this determination, “account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.” It also permits a physician, without the concurrence of others, to terminate a pregnancy where he is of the good faith opinion that the abortion “is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.”

5. The American law. In this country, the law in effect in all but a few States until mid-19th century was the preexisting English common law. Connecticut, the first State to enact abortion legislation, adopted in 1821 that part of Lord Ellenborough’s Act that related to a woman “quick with child.” [n29] The death penalty was not imposed. Abortion before quickening was made a crime in that State only in 1860. [n30] In 1828, New York enacted legislation [n31] that, in two respects, was to serve as a model for early anti-abortion statutes. First, while barring destruction of an unquickened fetus as well as a quick fetus, it made the former only a misdemeanor, but the latter second-degree manslaughter. Second, it incorporated a concept of therapeutic abortion by providing that an abortion was excused if it

shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have been advised by two physicians to be necessary for such purpose.

By 1840, when Texas had received the common law, [n32] only eight American States [p139] had statutes dealing with abortion. [n33] It was not until after the War Between the States that legislation began generally to replace the common law. Most of these initial statutes dealt severely with abortion after quickening, but were lenient with it before quickening. Most punished attempts equally with completed abortions. While many statutes included the exception for an abortion thought by one or more physicians to be necessary to save the mother’s life, that provision soon disappeared, and the typical law required that the procedure actually be necessary for that purpose. Gradually, in the middle and late 19th century, the quickening distinction disappeared from the statutory law of most States and the degree of the offense and the penalties were increased. By the end of the 1950’s, a large majority of the jurisdictions banned abortion, however and whenever performed, unless done to save or preserve the life of the mother. [n34] The exceptions, Alabama and the District of Columbia, permitted abortion to preserve the mother’s health. [n35] Three States permitted abortions that were not “unlawfully” performed or that were not “without lawful justification,” leaving interpretation of those standards to the courts. [n36] In [p140] the past several years, however, a trend toward liberalization of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by about one-third of the States, of less stringent laws, most of them patterned after the ALI Model Penal Code, § 230.3, [n37] set forth as Appendix B to the opinion in Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 205.

It is thus apparent that, at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least with respect to the early stage of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity [p141] to make this choice was present in this country well into the 19th century. Even later, the law continued for some time to treat less punitively an abortion procured in early pregnancy.

6. The position of the American Medical Association. The anti-abortion mood prevalent in this country in the late 19th century was shared by the medical profession. Indeed, the attitude of the profession may have played a significant role in the enactment of stringent criminal abortion legislation during that period.

An AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion was appointed in May, 1857. It presented its report, 12 Trans. of the Am.Med.Assn. 778 (1859), to the Twelfth Annual Meeting. That report observed that the Committee had been appointed to investigate criminal abortion “with a view to its general suppression.” It deplored abortion and its frequency and it listed three causes of “this general demoralization”:

The first of these causes is a widespread popular ignorance of the true character of the crime — a belief, even among mothers themselves, that the foetus is not alive till after the period of quickening.

The second of the agents alluded to is the fact that the profession themselves are frequently supposed careless of foetal life. . . .

The third reason of the frightful extent of this crime is found in the grave defects of our laws, both common and statute, as regards the independent and actual existence of the child before birth, as a living being. These errors, which are sufficient in most instances to prevent conviction, are based, and only based, upon mistaken and exploded medical dogmas. With strange inconsistency, the law fully acknowledges the foetus in utero and its inherent rights, for civil purposes; while personally and as criminally affected, it fails to recognize it, [p142] and to its life as yet denies all protection.

Id. at 776. The Committee then offered, and the Association adopted, resolutions protesting “against such unwarrantable destruction of human life,” calling upon state legislatures to revise their abortion laws, and requesting the cooperation of state medical societies “in pressing the subject.” Id. at 28, 78.

In 1871, a long and vivid report was submitted by the Committee on Criminal Abortion. It ended with the observation,

We had to deal with human life. In a matter of less importance, we could entertain no compromise. An honest judge on the bench would call things by their proper names. We could do no less.

22 Trans. of the Am.Med.Assn. 268 (1871). It proffered resolutions, adopted by the Association, id. at 38-39, recommending, among other things, that it

be unlawful and unprofessional for any physician to induce abortion or premature labor without the concurrent opinion of at least one respectable consulting physician, and then always with a view to the safety of the child — if that be possible,

and calling

the attention of the clergy of all denominations to the perverted views of morality entertained by a large class of females — aye, and men also, on this important question.

Except for periodic condemnation of the criminal abortionist, no further formal AMA action took place until 1967. In that year, the Committee on Human Reproduction urged the adoption of a stated policy of opposition to induced abortion except when there is “documented medical evidence” of a threat to the health or life of the mother, or that the child “may be born with incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency,” or that a pregnancy “resulting from legally established statutory or forcible rape or incest may constitute a threat to the mental or physical health of the [p143] patient,” two other physicians “chosen because of their recognized professional competence have examined the patient and have concurred in writing,” and the procedure “is performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.” The providing of medical information by physicians to state legislatures in their consideration of legislation regarding therapeutic abortion was “to be considered consistent with the principles of ethics of the American Medical Association.” This recommendation was adopted by the House of Delegates. Proceedings of the AMA House of Delegates 40-51 (June 1967).

In 1970, after the introduction of a variety of proposed resolutions and of a report from its Board of Trustees, a reference committee noted “polarization of the medical profession on this controversial issue”; division among those who had testified; a difference of opinion among AMA councils and.committees; “the remarkable shift in testimony” in six months, felt to be influenced “by the rapid changes in state laws and by the judicial decisions which tend to make abortion more freely available; ” and a feeling “that this trend will continue.” On June 25, 1970, the House of Delegates adopted preambles and most of the resolutions proposed by the reference committee. The preambles emphasized “the best interests of the patient,” “sound clinical judgment,” and “informed patient consent,” in contrast to “mere acquiescence to the patient’s demand.” The resolutions asserted that abortion is a medical procedure that should be performed by a licensed physician in an accredited hospital only after consultation with two other physicians and in conformity with state law, and that no party to the procedure should be required to violate personally held moral principles. [n38] Proceedings [p144] of the AMA House of Delegates 220 (June 1970). The AMA Judicial Council rendered a complementary opinion. [n39]

7. The position of the American Public Health Association. In October, 1970, the Executive Board of the APHA adopted Standards for Abortion Services. These were five in number:

a. Rapid and simple abortion referral must be readily available through state and local public [p145] health departments, medical societies, or other nonprofit organizations.

b. An important function of counseling should be to simplify and expedite the provision of abortion services; it should not delay the obtaining of these services.

c. Psychiatric consultation should not be mandatory. As in the case of other specialized medical services, psychiatric consultation should be sought for definite indications, and not on a routine basis.

d. A wide range of individuals from appropriately trained, sympathetic volunteers to highly skilled physicians may qualify as abortion counselors.

e. Contraception and/or sterilization should be discussed with each abortion patient.

Recommended Standards for Abortion Services, 61 Am.J.Pub.Health 396 (1971). Among factors pertinent to life and health risks associated with abortion were three that “are recognized as important”:

a. the skill of the physician,

b. the environment in which the abortion is performed, and above all

c. the duration of pregnancy, as determined by uterine size and confirmed by menstrual history.

Id. at 397.

It was said that “a well equipped hospital” offers more protection

to cope with unforeseen difficulties than an office or clinic without such resources. . . . The factor of gestational age is of overriding importance.

Thus, it was recommended that abortions in the second trimester and early abortions in the presence of existing medical complications be performed in hospitals as inpatient procedures. For pregnancies in the first trimester, [p146] abortion in the hospital with or without overnight stay “is probably the safest practice.” An abortion in an extramural facility, however, is an acceptable alternative “provided arrangements exist in advance to admit patients promptly if unforeseen complications develop.” Standards for an abortion facility were listed. It was said that, at present, abortions should be performed by physicians or osteopaths who are licensed to practice and who have “adequate training.” Id. at 398.

8. The position of the American Bar Association. At its meeting in February, 1972, the ABA House of Delegates approved, with 17 opposing votes, the Uniform Abortion Act that had been drafted and approved the preceding August by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 58 A.B.A.J. 380 (1972). We set forth the Act in full in the margin. [n40] The [p147] Opinion of the Court Conference has appended an enlightening Prefatory Note. [n41]

VII

Three reasons have been advanced to explain historically the enactment of criminal abortion laws in the 19th century and to justify their continued existence. [p148]

It has been argued occasionally that these laws were the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct. Texas, however, does not advance this justification in the present case, and it appears that no court or commentator has taken the argument seriously. [n42] The appellants and amici contend, moreover, that this is not a proper state purpose, at all and suggest that, if it were, the Texas statutes are overbroad in protecting it, since the law fails to distinguish between married and unwed mothers.

A second reason is concerned with abortion as a medical procedure. When most criminal abortion laws were first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for the woman. [n43] This was particularly true prior to the [p149] development of antisepsis. Antiseptic techniques, of course, were based on discoveries by Lister, Pasteur, and others first announced in 1867, but were not generally accepted and employed until about the turn of the century. Abortion mortality was high. Even after 1900, and perhaps until as late as the development of antibiotics in the 1940’s, standard modern techniques such as dilation and curettage were not nearly so safe as they are today. Thus, it has been argued that a State’s real concern in enacting a criminal abortion law was to protect the pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting to a procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy.

Modern medical techniques have altered this situation. Appellants and various amici refer to medical data indicating that abortion in early pregnancy, that is, prior to the end of the first trimester, although not without its risk, is now relatively safe. Mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower than the rates for normal childbirth. [n44] Consequently, any interest of the State in protecting the woman from an inherently hazardous procedure, except when it would be equally dangerous for her to forgo it, has largely disappeared. Of course, important state interests in the areas of health and medical standards do remain. [p150] The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient. This interest obviously extends at least to the performing physician and his staff, to the facilities involved, to the availability of after-care, and to adequate provision for any complication or emergency that might arise. The prevalence of high mortality rates at illegal “abortion mills” strengthens, rather than weakens, the State’s interest in regulating the conditions under which abortions are performed. Moreover, the risk to the woman increases as her pregnancy continues. Thus, the State retains a definite interest in protecting the woman’s own health and safety when an abortion is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy.

The third reason is the State’s interest — some phrase it in terms of duty — in protecting prenatal life. Some of the argument for this justification rests on the theory that a new human life is present from the moment of conception. [n45] The State’s interest and general obligation to protect life then extends, it is argued, to prenatal life. Only when the life of the pregnant mother herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries within her, should the interest of the embryo or fetus not prevail. Logically, of course, a legitimate state interest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or at some other point prior to live birth. In assessing the State’s interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone. [p151]

Parties challenging state abortion laws have sharply disputed in some courts the contention that a purpose of these laws, when enacted, was to protect prenatal life. [n46] Pointing to the absence of legislative history to support the contention, they claim that most state laws were designed solely to protect the woman. Because medical advances have lessened this concern, at least with respect to abortion in early pregnancy, they argue that with respect to such abortions the laws can no longer be justified by any state interest. There is some scholarly support for this view of original purpose. [n47] The few state courts called upon to interpret their laws in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the State’s interest in protecting the woman’s health, rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus. [n48] Proponents of this view point out that in many States, including Texas, [n49] by statute or judicial interpretation, the pregnant woman herself could not be prosecuted for self-abortion or for cooperating in an abortion performed upon her by another. [n50] They claim that adoption of the “quickening” distinction through received common [p152] law and state statutes tacitly recognizes the greater health hazards inherent in late abortion and impliedly repudiates the theory that life begins at conception.

It is with these interests, and the eight to be attached to them, that this case is concerned.

VIII

The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484-485; in the Ninth Amendment, id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453-454; id. at 460, 463-465 [p153] (WHITE, J., concurring in result); family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and childrearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, supra.

This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.

On the basis of elements such as these, appellant and some amici argue that the woman’s right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree. Appellant’s arguments that Texas either has no valid interest at all in regulating the abortion decision, or no interest strong enough to support any limitation upon the woman’s sole determination, are unpersuasive. The [p154] Court’s decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court’s decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) ( sterilization).

We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified, and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.

We note that those federal and state courts that have recently considered abortion law challenges have reached the same conclusion. A majority, in addition to the District Court in the present case, have held state laws unconstitutional, at least in part, because of vagueness or because of overbreadth and abridgment of rights. Abele v. Markle, 342 F.Supp. 800 (Conn.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-56; Abele v. Markle, 351 F.Supp. 224 (Conn.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-730; Doe v. Bolton, 319 F.Supp. 1048 (ND Ga.1970), appeal decided today, post, p. 179; Doe v. Scott, 321 F.Supp. 1385 (ND Ill.1971), appeal docketed, No. 70-105; Poe v. Menghini, 339 F.Supp. 986 (Kan.1972); YWCA v. Kuler, 342 F.Supp. 1048 (NJ 1972); Babbitz v. McCann, [p155] 310 F.Supp. 293 (ED Wis.1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); People v. Belous, 71 Cal.2d 954, 458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); State v. Barquet, 262 So.2d 431 (Fla.1972).

Others have sustained state statutes. Crossen v. Attorney General, 344 F.Supp. 587 (ED Ky.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-256; Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F.Supp. 1217 (ED La.1970), appeal docketed, No. 70-42; Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F.Supp. 1248 (WDNC 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-92; Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F.Supp. 741 (ND Ohio 1970); Doe v. Rampton (Utah 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-5666; Cheaney v. State, ___ Ind. ___, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972); Spears v. State, 257 So.2d 876 (Miss. 1972); State v. Munson, 86 S.D. 663, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-631.

Although the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute, and is subject to some limitations; and that, at some point, the state interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant. We agree with this approach.

Where certain “fundamental rights” are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a “compelling state interest,” Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963), and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-308 (1940); see [p156] Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 460, 463-464 (WHITE, J., concurring in result).

In the recent abortion cases cited above, courts have recognized these principles. Those striking down state laws have generally scrutinized the State’s interests in protecting health and potential life, and have concluded that neither interest justified broad limitations on the reasons for which a physician and his pregnant patient might decide that she should have an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. Courts sustaining state laws have held that the State’s determinations to protect health or prenatal life are dominant and constitutionally justifiable.

IX

The District Court held that the appellee failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the Texas statute’s infringement upon Roe’s rights was necessary to support a compelling state interest, and that, although the appellee presented “several compelling justifications for state presence in the area of abortions,” the statutes outstripped these justifications and swept “far beyond any areas of compelling state interest.” 314 F.Supp. at 1222-1223. Appellant and appellee both contest that holding. Appellant, as has been indicated, claims an absolute right that bars any state imposition of criminal penalties in the area. Appellee argues that the State’s determination to recognize and protect prenatal life from and after conception constitutes a compelling state interest. As noted above, we do not agree fully with either formulation.

A. The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a “person” within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in detail the well known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant’s case, of course, collapses, [p157] for the fetus’ right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much on reargument. [n51] On the other hand, the appellee conceded on reargument [n52] that no case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Constitution does not define “person” in so many words. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to “person.” The first, in defining “citizens,” speaks of “persons born or naturalized in the United States.” The word also appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause. “Person” is used in other places in the Constitution: in the listing of qualifications for Representatives and Senators, Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, and § 3, cl. 3; in the Apportionment Clause, Art. I, § 2, cl. 3; [n53] in the Migration and Importation provision, Art. I, § 9, cl. 1; in the Emolument Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 8; in the Electors provisions, Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, and the superseded cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the office of President, Art. II, § 1, cl. 5; in the Extradition provisions, Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, and the superseded Fugitive Slave Clause 3; and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as in §§ 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only post-natally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application. [n54] [p158]

All this, together with our observation, supra, that, throughout the major portion of the 19th century, prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word “person,” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn. [n55] This is in accord with the results reached in those few cases where the issue has been squarely presented. McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hospital, 340 F.Supp. 751 (WD Pa.1972); Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887 (1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-434; Abele v. Markle, 351 F.Supp. 224 (Conn.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-730. Cf. Cheaney v. State, ___ Ind. at ___, 285 N.E.2d at 270; Montana v. Rogers, 278 F.2d 68, 72 (CA7 1960), aff’d sub nom. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961); Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 619, 470 P.2d 617 (1970); State v. Dickinson, 28 [p159] Ohio St.2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971). Indeed, our decision in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), inferentially is to the same effect, for we there would not have indulged in statutory interpretation favorable to abortion in specified circumstances if the necessary consequence was the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.

This conclusion, however, does not of itself fully answer the contentions raised by Texas, and we pass on to other considerations.

B. The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing young in the human uterus. See Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 478-479, 547 (24th ed.1965). The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education, with which Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, and Pierce and Meyer were respectively concerned. As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that, at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman’s privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.

Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception. We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer. [p160]

It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and difficult question. There has always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until live’ birth. This was the belief of the Stoics. [n56] It appears to be the predominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith. [n57] It may be taken to represent also the position of a large segment of the Protestant community, insofar as that can be ascertained; organized groups that have taken a formal position on the abortion issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of the individual and her family. [n58] As we have noted, the common law found greater significance in quickening. Physician and their scientific colleagues have regarded that event with less interest and have tended to focus either upon conception, upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes “viable,” that is, potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid. [n59] Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks. [n60] The Aristotelian theory of “mediate animation,” that held sway throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official Roman Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite opposition to this “ensoulment” theory from those in the Church who would recognize the existence of life from [p161] the moment of conception. [n61] The latter is now, of course, the official belief of the Catholic Church. As one brief amicus discloses, this is a view strongly held by many non-Catholics as well, and by many physicians. Substantial problems for precise definition of this view are posed, however, by new embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is a “process” over time, rather than an event, and by new medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the “morning-after” pill, implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even artificial wombs. [n62]

In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth, or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth. For example, the traditional rule of tort law denied recovery for prenatal injuries even though the child was born alive. [n63] That rule has been changed in almost every jurisdiction. In most States, recovery is said to be permitted only if the fetus was viable, or at least quick, when the injuries were sustained, though few [p162] courts have squarely so held. [n64] In a recent development, generally opposed by the commentators, some States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. [n65] Such an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents’ interest and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life. Similarly, unborn children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of property, and have been represented by guardians ad litem. [n66] Perfection of the interests involved, again, has generally been contingent upon live birth. In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.

X

In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. We repeat, however, that the State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the State or a nonresident who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that it has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches [p163] term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes “compelling.”

With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the “compelling” point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-established medical fact, referred to above at 149, that, until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health. Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.

This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this “compelling” point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.

With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the “compelling” point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion [p164] during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.

Measured against these standards, Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in restricting legal abortions to those “procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother,” sweeps too broadly. The statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single reason, “saving” the mother’s life, the legal justification for the procedure. The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it here.

This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider the additional challenge to the Texas statute asserted on grounds of vagueness. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 67-72.

XI

To summarize and to repeat:

1. A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.

(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.

(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life [p165] may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.

2. The State may define the term “physician,” as it has been employed in the preceding paragraphs of this Part XI of this opinion, to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined.

In Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, procedural requirements contained in one of the modern abortion statutes are considered. That opinion and this one, of course, are to be read together. [n67]

This holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative weights of the respective interests involved, with the lessons and examples of medical and legal history, with the lenity of the common law, and with the demands of the profound problems of the present day. The decision leaves the State free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests. The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where important [p166] state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician. If an individual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising proper medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional, are available.

XII

Our conclusion that Art. 1196 is unconstitutional means, of course, that the Texas abortion statutes, as a unit, must fall. The exception of Art. 1196 cannot be struck down separately, for then the State would be left with a statute proscribing all abortion procedures no matter how medically urgent the case.

Although the District Court granted appellant Roe declaratory relief, it stopped short of issuing an injunction against enforcement of the Texas statutes. The Court has recognized that different considerations enter into a federal court’s decision as to declaratory relief, on the one hand, and injunctive relief, on the other. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252-255 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). We are not dealing with a statute that, on its face, appears to abridge free expression, an area of particular concern under Dombrowski and refined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 50.

We find it unnecessary to decide whether the District Court erred in withholding injunctive relief, for we assume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will give full credence to this decision that the present criminal abortion statutes of that State are unconstitutional.

The judgment of the District Court as to intervenor Hallford is reversed, and Dr. Hallford’s complaint in intervention is dismissed. In all other respects, the judgment [p167] of the District Court is affirmed. Costs are allowed to the appellee.

It is so ordered.

[For concurring opinion of MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, see post, p. 207.]

[For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, see post, p. 209.]

[For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE, see post, p. 221.]

1.

Article 1191. Abortion

If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards her any violence or means whatever externally or internally applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment shall be doubled. By “abortion” is meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman’s womb or that a premature birth thereof be caused.

Art. 1192. Furnishing the means

Whoever furnishes the means for procuring an abortion knowing the purpose intended is guilty as an accomplice.

Art. 1193. Attempt at abortion

If the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the offender is nevertheless guilty of an attempt to produce abortion, provided it be shown that such means were calculated to produce that result, and shall be fined not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.

Art. 1194. Murder in producing abortion

If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abortion so produced or by an attempt to effect the same it is murder.

Art. 1196. By medical advice

Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.

The foregoing Articles, together with Art. 1195, compose Chapter 9 of Title 15 of the Penal Code. Article 1195, not attacked here, reads:

Art. 1195. Destroying unborn child

Whoever shall during parturition of the mother destroy the vitality or life in a child in a state of being born and before actual birth, which child would otherwise have been born alive, shall be confined in the penitentiary for life or for not less than five years.

2. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-211 (1956); Conn.Pub. Act No. 1 (May 1972 special session) (in 4 Conn.Leg.Serv. 677 (1972)), and Conn.Gen.Stat.Rev. §§ 53-29, 53-30 (1968) (or unborn child); Idaho Code § 18-601 (1948); Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, § 23-1 (1971); Ind.Code § 35-1-58-1 (1971); Iowa Code § 701.1 (1971); Ky.Rev.Stat. § 436.020 (1962); La.Rev.Stat. § 37: 1285(6) (1964) (loss of medical license) (but see § 14:87 (Supp. 1972) containing no exception for the life of the mother under the criminal statute); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann, Tit. 17, § 51 (1964); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., c. 272, § 19 (1970) (using the term “unlawfully,” construed to exclude an abortion to save the mother’s life, Kudish v. Bd. of Registration, 356 Mass. 98, 248 N.E.2d 264 (1969)); Mich.Comp.Laws § 750.14 (1948); Minn.Stat. § 617.18 (1971); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 559.100 (1969); Mont.Rev.Codes Ann. § 94-401 (1969); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-405 (1964); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 200.220 (1967); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 585: 13 (1955); N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2A:87-1 (1969) (“without lawful justification”); N.D.Cent.Code §§ 12-25-01, 12-25-02 (1960); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2901.16 (1953); Okla.Stat.Ann., Tit. 21, § 861 (1972-1973 Supp.); Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 18, §§ 4718, 4719 (1963) (“unlawful”); R.I.Gen.Laws Ann. § 11-3-1 (1969); S.D.Comp.Laws Ann. § 22-17-1 (1967); Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-301, 39-302 (1956); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-1, 76-2-2 (1953); Vt.Stat.Ann., Tit. 13, § 101 (1958); W.Va.Code Ann. § 61-2-8 (1966); Wis.Stat. § 940.04 (1969); Wyo.Stat.Ann. §§ 6-77, 6-78 (1957).

3. Long ago, a suggestion was made that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague because of definitional deficiencies. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disposed of that suggestion peremptorily, saying only,

It is also insisted in the motion in arrest of judgment that the statute is unconstitutional and void in that it does not sufficiently define or describe the offense of abortion. We do not concur in respect to this question.

Jackson v. State, 55 Tex.Cr.R. 79, 89, 115 S.W. 262, 268 (1908). The same court recently has held again that the State’s abortion statutes are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Thompson v. State (Ct.Crim.App. Tex.1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-1200. The court held that “the State of Texas has a compelling interest to protect fetal life”; that Art. 1191 “is designed to protect fetal life”; that the Texas homicide statutes, particularly Art. 1205 of the Penal Code, are intended to protect a person “in existence by actual birth,” and thereby implicitly recognize other human life that is not “in existence by actual birth”; that the definition of human life is for the legislature and not the courts; that Art. 1196 “is more definite than the District of Columbia statute upheld in [United States v.] Vuitch” (402 U.S. 62); and that the Texas statute “is not vague and indefinite or overbroad.” A physician’s abortion conviction was affirmed.

In Thompson, n. 2, the court observed that any issue as to the burden of proof under the exemption of Art. 1196 “is not before us.” But see Veevers v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 162, 168-169, 354 S.W.2d 161, 166-167 (1962). Cf. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 69-71 (1971).

4. The name is a pseudonym.

5. These names are pseudonyms.

6. The appellee twice states in his brief that the hearing before the District Court was held on July 22, 1970. Brief for Appellee 13. The docket entries,App. 2, and the transcript, App. 76, reveal this to be an error. The July date appears to be the time of the reporter’s transcription. See App. 77.

7. We need not consider what different result, if any, would follow if Dr. Hallford’s intervention were on behalf of a class. His complaint in intervention does not purport to assert a class suit, and makes no reference to any class apart from an allegation that he “and others similarly situated” must necessarily guess at the meaning of Art. 1196. His application for leave to intervene goes somewhat further, for it asserts that plaintiff Roe does not adequately protect the interest of the doctor “and the class of people who are physicians . . . [and] the class of people who are . . . patients. . . .” The leave application, however, is not the complaint. Despite the District Court’s statement to the contrary, 314 F.Supp. at 1225, we fail to perceive the essentials of a class suit in the Hallford complaint.

8. A. Castiglioni, A History of Medicine 84 (2d ed.1947), E. Krumbhaar, translator and editor (hereinafter Castiglioni).

9. J. Ricci, The Genealogy of Gynaecology 52, 84, 113, 149 (2d ed.1950) (hereinafter Ricci); L. Lader, Abortion 75-77 (1966) (hereinafter Lader), K. Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United States, in Abortion and the Law 37, 38-40 (D. Smith ed.1967); G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law 148 (1957) (hereinafter Williams); J. Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in The Morality of Abortion 1, 3-7 (J. Noonan ed.1970) (hereinafter Noonan); Quay, Justifiable Abortion — Medical and Legal Foundations (pt. 2), 49 Geo.L.J. 395, 40622 (1961) (hereinafter Quay).

10. L. Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath 10 (1943) (hereinafter Edelstein). But see Castiglioni 227.

11. Edelstein 12; Ricci 113-114, 118-119; Noonan 5.

12. Edelstein 13-14

13. Castiglioni 148.

14. Id. at 154.

15. Edelstein 3.

16. Id. at 12, 15-18.

17. Id. at 18; Lader 76.

18. Edelstein 63.

19. Id. at 64.

20. Dorand’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1261 (24th ed.1965).

21. E. Coke, Institutes III *50; 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, c. 31, § 16 (4th ed. 1762); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *129-130; M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 433 (1st Amer. ed. 1847). For discussions of the role of the quickening concept in English common law, see Lader 78; Noonan 223-226; Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality (pt. 1), 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 418-428 (1968) (hereinafter Means I); Stern, Abortion: Reform and the Law, 59 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 84 (1968) (hereinafter Stern); Quay 430-432; Williams 152.

22. Early philosophers believed that the embryo or fetus did not become formed and begin to live until at least 40 days after conception for a male and 80 to 90 days for a female. See, for example, Aristotle, Hist.Anim. 7.3.583b; Gen.Anim. 2.3.736, 2.5.741; Hippocrates, Lib. de Nat.Puer., No. 10. Aristotle’s thinking derived from his three-stage theory of life: vegetable, animal, rational. The vegetable stage was reached at conception, the animal at “animation,” and the rational soon after live birth. This theory, together with the 40/80 day view, came to be accepted by early Christian thinkers.

The theological debate was reflected in the writings of St. Augustine, who made a distinction between embryo inanimatus, not yet endowed with a soul, and embryo animatus. He may have drawn upon Exodus 21:22. At one point, however, he expressed the view that human powers cannot determine the point during fetal development at which the critical change occurs. See Augustine, De Origine Animae 4.4 (Pub.Law 44.527). See also W. Reany, The Creation of the Human Soul, c. 2 and 83-86 (1932); Huser, The Crime of Abortion in Canon Law 15 (Catholic Univ. of America, Canon Law Studies No. 162, Washington, D.C.1942).

Galen, in three treatises related to embryology, accepted the thinking of Aristotle and his followers. Quay 426-427. Later, Augustine on abortion was incorporated by Gratian into the Decretum, published about 1140. Decretum Magistri Gratiani 2.32.2.7 to 2.32.2.10, in 1 Corpus Juris Canonici 1122, 1123 (A. Friedburg, 2d ed. 1879). This Decretal and the Decretals that followed were recognized as the definitive body of canon law until the new Code of 1917.

For discussions of the canon law treatment, see Means I, pp. 411-412; Noonan 20-26; Quay 426-430; see also J. Noonan, Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists 18-29 (1965).

23. Bracton took the position that abortion by blow or poison was homicide “if the foetus be already formed and animated, and particularly if it be animated.” 2 H. Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 279 (T. Twiss ed. 1879), or, as a later translation puts it, “if the foetus is already formed or quickened, especially if it is quickened,” 2 H. Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England 341 (S. Thorne ed.1968). See Quay 431; see also 2 Fleta 661 (Book 1, c. 23) (Selden Society ed.1955).

24. E. Coke, Institutes III *50.

25. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *129-130.

26. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth Century Common Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971) (hereinafter Means II). The author examines the two principal precedents cited marginally by Coke, both contrary to his dictum, and traces the treatment of these and other cases by earlier commentators. He concludes that Coke, who himself participated as an advocate in an abortion case in 1601, may have intentionally misstated the law. The author even suggests a reason: Coke’s strong feelings against abortion, coupled with his determination to assert common law (secular) jurisdiction to assess penalties for an offense that traditionally had been an exclusively ecclesiastical or canon law crime. See also Lader 78-79, who notes that some scholars doubt that the common law ever was applied to abortion; that the English ecclesiastical courts seem to have lost interest in the problem after 1527; and that the preamble to the English legislation of 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, § 1, referred to in the text, infra at 136, states that “no adequate means have been hitherto provided for the prevention and punishment of such offenses.”

27. Commonwealth v. Bangs, 9 Mass. 387, 388 (1812); Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. (9 Metc.) 263, 265-266 (1845); State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52, 58 (1849); Abrams v. Foshee, 3 Iowa 274, 278-280 (1856); Smith v. Gaffard, 31 Ala. 45, 51 (1857); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204, 210 (1879); Eggart v. State, 40 Fla. 527, 532, 25 So. 144, 145 (1898); State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 606, 64 P. 1014, 1016 (1901); Edwards v. State, 79 Neb. 251, 252, 112 N.W. 611, 612 (1907); Gray v. State, 77 Tex.Cr.R. 221, 224, 178 S.W. 337, 338 (1915); Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 169, 56 S.E.2d 217, 221 (1949). Contra, Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633 (1850); State v. Slagle, 83 N.C. 630, 632 (1880).

28. See Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 55 (1851); Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86, 88 (1872); Lamb v. State, 67 Md. 524, 533, 10 A. 208 (1887).

29. Conn.Stat., Tit. 20, § 14 (1821).

30. Conn.Pub. Acts, c. 71, § 1 (1860).

31. N.Y.Rev.Stat., pt. 4, c. 1, Tit. 2, Art. 1, § 9, p. 661, and Tit. 6, § 21, p. 694 (1829).

32. Act of Jan. 20, 1840, § 1, set forth in 2 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 177-178 (1898); see Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 600, 153 S.W. 1124, 1125 (1913).

33. The early statutes are discussed in Quay 435-438. See also Lader 85-88; Stern 85-86; and Means II 37376.

34. Criminal abortion statutes in effect in the States as of 1961, together with historical statutory development and important judicial interpretations of the state statutes, are cited and quoted in Quay 447-520. See Comment, A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion: The Contradictions and the Problems, 1972 U.Ill.L.F. 177, 179, classifying the abortion statutes and listing 25 States as permitting abortion only if necessary to save or preserve the mother’s life.

35. Ala.Code, Tit. 14, § 9 (1958); D.C.Code Ann. § 22-201 (1967).

36. Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., c. 272, § 19 (1970); N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2A: 87-1 (1969); Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 18, §§ 4718, 4719 (1963).

37. Fourteen States have adopted some form of the ALI statute. See Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 41-303 to 41-310 (Supp. 1971); Calif.Health & Safety Code §§ 25950-25955.5 (Supp. 1972); Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 40-2-50 to 40-2-53 (Cum.Supp. 1967); Del.Code Ann., Tit. 24, §§ 1790-1793 (Supp. 1972); Florida Law of Apr. 13, 1972, c. 72-196, 1972 Fla.Sess.Law Serv., pp. 380-382; Ga.Code §§ 26-1201 to 26-1203 (1972); Kan.Stat.Ann. § 21-3407 (Supp. 1971); Md.Ann.Code, Art. 43, §§ 137-139 (1971); Miss.Code Ann. § 2223 (Supp. 1972); N.M.Stat.Ann. §§ 40A-5-1 to 40A-5-3 (1972); N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971); Ore.Rev.Stat. §§ 435.405 to 435.495 (1971); S.C.Code Ann. §§ 16-82 to 16-89 (1962 and Supp. 1971); Va.Code Ann. §§ 18.1-62 to 18.1-62.3 (Supp. 1972). Mr. Justice Clark described some of these States as having “led the way.” Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal, 2 Loyola U. (L.A.) L.Rev. 1, 11 (1969).

By the end of 1970, four other States had repealed criminal penalties for abortions performed in early pregnancy by a licensed physician, subject to stated procedural and health requirements. Alaska Stat. § 11.15.060 (1970); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 453-16 (Supp. 1971); N.Y.Penal Code § 125.05, subd. 3 (Supp. 1972-1973); Wash.Rev.Code §§ 9.02.060 to 9.02.080 (Supp. 1972). The precise status of criminal abortion laws in some States is made unclear by recent decisions in state and federal courts striking down existing state laws, in whole or in part.

38.

Whereas, Abortion, like any other medical procedure, should not be performed when contrary to the best interests of the patient since good medical practice requires due consideration for the patient’s welfare, and not mere acquiescence to the patient’s demand; and

Whereas, The standards of sound clinical judgment, which, together with informed patient consent, should be determinative according to the merits of each individual case; therefore be it

RESOLVED, That abortion is a medical procedure and should be performed only by a duly licensed physician and surgeon in an accredited hospital acting only after consultation with two other physicians chosen because of their professional competency and in conformance with standards of good medical practice and the Medical Practice Act of his State; and be it further

RESOLVED, That no physician or other professional personnel shall be compelled to perform any act which violates his good medical judgment. Neither physician, hospital, nor hospital personnel shall be required to perform any act violative of personally held moral principles. In these circumstances, good medical practice requires only that the physician or other professional personnel withdraw from the case so long as the withdrawal is consistent with good medical practice.

Proceedings of the AMA House of Delegates 220 (June 1970).

39.

The Principles of Medical Ethics of the AMA do not prohibit a physician from performing an abortion that is performed in accordance with good medical practice and under circumstances that do not violate the laws of the community in which he practices.

In the matter of abortions, as of any other medical procedure, the Judicial Council becomes involved whenever there is alleged violation of the Principles of Medical Ethics as established by the House of Delegates.

40.

UNIFORM ABORTION ACT

SECTION 1. [Abortion Defined; When Authorized.]

(a) “Abortion” means the termination of human pregnancy with an intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus.

(b) An abortion may be performed in this state only if it is performed:

(1) by a physician licensed to practice medicine [or osteopathy] in this state or by a physician practicing medicine [or osteopathy] in the employ of the government of the United States or of this state, [and the abortion is performed] [in the physician’s office or in a medical clinic, or] in a hospital approved by the [Department of Health] or operated by the United States, this state, or any department, agency, [or political subdivision of either;] or by a female upon herself upon the advice of the physician; and

(2) within [20] weeks after the commencement of the pregnancy [or after [20] weeks only if the physician has reasonable cause to believe (i) there is a substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would endanger the life of the mother or would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother, (ii) that the child would be born with grave physical or mental defect, or (iii) that the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, or illicit intercourse with a girl under the age of 16 years].

SECTION 2. [Penalty.] Any person who performs or procures an abortion other than authorized by this Act is guilty of a [felony] and, upon conviction thereof, may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding [$1,000] or to imprisonment [in the state penitentiary] not exceeding [5 years], or both.

SECTION 3. [Uniformity of Interpretation.] This Act shall be construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this Act among those states which enact it.

SECTION 4. [Short Title.] This Act may be cited as the Uniform Abortion Act.

SECTION 5. [Severability.] If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.

SECTION 6. [Repeal.] The following acts and parts of acts are repealed:

(1)

(2)

(3)

SECTION 7. [Time of Taking Effect.] This Act shall take effect _________.

41.

This Act is based largely upon the New York abortion act following a review of the more recent laws on abortion in several states and upon recognition of a more liberal trend in laws on this subject. Recognition was given also to the several decisions in state and federal courts which show a further trend toward liberalization of abortion laws, especially during the first trimester of pregnancy.

Recognizing that a number of problems appeared in New York, a shorter time period for “unlimited” abortions was advisable. The time period was bracketed to permit the various states to insert a figure more in keeping with the different conditions that might exist among the states. Likewise, the language limiting the place or places in which abortions may be performed was also bracketed to account for different conditions among the states. In addition, limitations on abortions after the initial “unlimited” period were placed in brackets so that individual states may adopt all or any of these reasons, or place further restrictions upon abortions after the initial period.

This Act does not contain any provision relating to medical review committees or prohibitions against sanctions imposed upon medical personnel refusing to participate in abortions because of religious or other similar reasons, or the like. Such provisions, while related, do not directly pertain to when, where, or by whom abortions may be performed; however, the Act is not drafted to exclude such a provision by a state wishing to enact the same.

42. See, for example, YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F.Supp. 1048, 1074 (N.J.1972); Abele v. Markle, 342 F.Supp. 800, 805-806 (Conn.1972) (Newman, J., concurring in result), appeal docketed, No. 72-56; Walsingham v. State, 250 So.2d 857, 863 (Ervin, J., concurring) (Fla.1971); State v. Gedicke, 43 N.J.L. 86, 90 (1881); Means II 381-382.

43. See C. Haagensen & W. Lloyd, A Hundred Years of Medicine 19 (1943).

44. Potts, Postconceptive Control of Fertility, 8 Int’l J. of G. & O. 957, 967 (1970) (England and Wales); Abortion Mortality, 20 Morbidity and Mortality 208, 209 (June 12, 1971) (U.S. Dept. of HEW, Public Health Service) (New York City); Tietze, United States: Therapeutic Abortions, 1963-1968, 59 Studies in Family Planning 5, 7 (1970); Tietze, Mortality with Contraception and Induced Abortion, 45 Studies in Family Planning 6 (1969) (Japan, Czechoslovakia, Hungary); Tietze Lehfeldt, Legal Abortion in Eastern Europe, 175 J.A.M.A. 1149, 1152 (April 1961). Other sources are discussed in Lader 17-23.

45. See Brief of Amicus National Right to Life Committee; R. Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right to Be Born, in Abortion and the Law 107 (D. Smith ed.1967); Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 233 (1969); Noonan 1.

46. See, e.g., Abele v. Markle, 342 F.Supp. 800 (Conn.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-56.

47. See discussions in Means I and Means II.

48. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (1858).

49. Watson v. State, 9 Tex.App. 237, 244-245 (1880); Moore v. State, 37 Tex. Cr.R. 552, 561, 40 S.W. 287, 290 (1897); Shaw v. State, 73 Tex.Cr.R. 337, 339, 165 S.W. 930, 931 (1914); Fondren v. State, 74 Tex.Cr.R. 552, 557, 169 S.W. 411, 414 (1914); Gray v. State, 77 Tex.Cr.R. 221, 229, 178 S.W. 337, 341 (1915). There is no immunity in Texas for the father who is not married to the mother. Hammett v. State, 84 Tex.Cr.R. 635, 209 S.W. 661 (1919); Thompson v. State (Ct.Crim.App. Tex.1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-1200.

50. See Smith v. State, 33 Me. at 55; In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 450, 67 A.2d 141, 144 (1949). A short discussion of the modern law on this issue is contained in the Comment to the ALI’s Model Penal Code § 207.11, at 158 and nn. 35-37 (Tent.Draft No. 9, 1959).

51. Tr. of Oral Rearg. 20-21.

52. Tr. of Oral Rearg. 24.

53. We are not aware that in the taking of any census under this clause, a fetus has ever been counted.

54. When Texas urges that a fetus is entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection as a person, it faces a dilemma. Neither in Texas nor in any other State are all abortions prohibited. Despite broad proscription, an exception always exists. The exception contained in Art. 1196, for an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother, is typical. But if the fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of life without due process of law, and if the mother’s condition is the sole determinant, does not the Texas exception appear to be out of line with the Amendment’s command?

There are other inconsistencies between Fourteenth Amendment status and the typical abortion statute. It has already been pointed out, n. 49, supra, that, in Texas, the woman is not a principal or an accomplice with respect to an abortion upon her. If the fetus is a person, why is the woman not a principal or an accomplice? Further, the penalty for criminal abortion specified by Art. 1195 is significantly less than the maximum penalty for murder prescribed by Art. 1257 of the Texas Penal Code. If the fetus is a person, may the penalties be different?

55. Cf. the Wisconsin abortion statute, defining “unborn child” to mean “a human being from the time of conception until it is born alive,” Wis.Stat. § 940.04(6) (1969), and the new Connecticut statute, Pub.Act No. 1 (May 1972 special session), declaring it to be the public policy of the State and the legislative intent “to protect and preserve human life from the moment of conception.”

56. Edelstein 16.

57. Lader 97-99; D. Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law 251-294 (1968). For a stricter view, see I. Jakobovits, Jewish Views on Abortion, in Abortion and the Law 124 (D. Smith ed.1967).

58. Amicus Brief for the American Ethical Union et al. For the position of the National Council of Churches and of other denominations, see Lader 99-101.

59. Hellman & J. Pritchard, Williams Obstetrics 493 (14th ed.1971); Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1689 (24th ed.1965).

60. Hellman & Pritchard, supra, n. 59, at 493.

61. For discussions of the development of the Roman Catholic position, see D. Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice, and Morality 409-447 (1970); Noonan 1.

62. See Brodie, The New Biology and the Prenatal Child, 9 J.Family L. 391, 397 (1970); Gorney, The New Biology and the Future of Man, 15 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 273 (1968); Note, Criminal Law — Abortion — The “Morning-After Pill” and Other Pre-Implantation Birth-Control Methods and the Law, 46 Ore.L.Rev. 211 (1967); G. Taylor, The Biological Time Bomb 32 (1968); A. Rosenfeld, The Second Genesis 138-139 (1969); Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 Mich.L.Rev. 127 (1968); Note, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 1968 U.Ill.L.F. 203.

63. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 335-338 (4th ed.1971); 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 1028-1031 (1956); Note, 63 Harv.L.Rev. 173 (1949).

64. See cases cited in Prosser, supra, n. 63, at 336-338; Annotation, Action for Death of Unborn Child, 15 A.L.R.3d 992 (1967).

65. Prosser, supra, n. 63, at 338; Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 Notre Dame Law. 349, 354-360 (1971).

66. Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 233, 235-238 (1969); Note, 56 Iowa L.Rev. 994, 999-1000 (1971); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child, 46 Notre Dame Law. 349, 351-354 (1971).

67. Neither in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, do we discuss the father’s rights, if any exist in the constitutional context, in the abortion decision. No paternal right has been asserted in either of the cases, and the Texas and the Georgia statutes on their face take no cognizance of the father. We are aware that some statutes recognize the father under certain circumstances. North Carolina, for example, N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971), requires written permission for the abortion from the husband when the woman is a married minor, that is, when she is less than 18 years of age, 41 N.C.A.G. 489 (1971); if the woman is an unmarried minor, written permission from the parents is required. We need not now decide whether provisions of this kind are constitutional.

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